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Historically, catastrophic accidents have been important drivers for the development of 
safety systems in the railway industry. The railway industry is becoming safer than ever, 
but catastrophic accidents still happen. This may be because, as a society becomes more 
complex and complicated, the causes of accidents also become more complex and 
complicated. Many railway accidents are caused by organisational failures, which are 
compounded by human error and inadequate organisational cultures. Among the various 
approaches that have been tried to reduce the risk of complication and complexity related 
accidents, establishing a good safety culture is considered an effective solution. Although 
safety culture is influenced by various factors inside and outside of an organisation, it is 
thought to be closely related to an informed culture. Thus, developing effective reporting 
channels is very important to improve an organisation’s safety culture. However, many 
safety events have not been reported due to a perceived blame culture or fear of 
disciplinary action. To overcome this ‘under-reporting’, so-called confidential incident 
reporting systems (CIRSs) have been adopted in some industries, to ensure confidentiality 
of ‘reporters’ to facilitate reporting of safety events. 
The aim of this research is to improve Korea’s railway safety culture by changing the 
reporting culture. Since most research into railway safety culture has concentrated on the 
railway operations sector, this author researched the railway construction field, which has 
not yet been studied. Through this research, the author assessed the actual safety culture 
of Korean construction sites and investigated the feasibility of implementing a CIRS for 
Korea’s railways. As a result of the research, the author suggests a tailor-made CIRS model. 
To meet the aims of the research, the author needed quantitative data to generalise the 
safety culture and qualitative data, to understand the underlying issues and opinions of 
frontline staff. In this regard, a mixed methods research approach was used, which includes 
both quantitative and qualitative data. Based on the methodology, the author conducted 
a series of case studies, questionnaire surveys and interviews. 
The case studies were performed on two themes: The author assessed the levels of safety 
and of safety culture of Korea’s railway, and identified the characteristics and effectiveness 
of CIRSs. The safety performance of Korean railways has improved steadily and has reached 
a similar level to that of major EU countries, however, the safety culture has remained at a 
relatively low level. The case study of CIRSs was conducted by looking at actual practice in 
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The author adopted a modular structure to create the KCIRS model in a functional manner. 
This approach is different from CIRAS, in which an institution manages the whole railway 
industry, or C3RS, in which each railway company operates its own system. KCIRS’s modular 
architecture makes it easy to adopt progressively and to standardise the CIRSs. This suits 
the structure of the Korean railway industry, where only a small number of institutions are 
responsible for operation, maintenance and construction. 
For efficient operation of the KCIRS model, the author also presents the concept for the 
reporting process and the roles and responsibilities of the KCIRS entities comprising the 
KCIRS Office (KCO), Module Support Team (MST) and Company Support Team (CST). In 
addition, the author establishes and presents various strategies for efficient operation of 
KCIRS, e.g., securing confidentiality, evaluation and improvement, systematic education 
and adoption of KCIRS. 
In the future, if further research on evaluation, standardisation and modular structures is 
conducted, the KCIRS model will be more applicable to Korean railways. 
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1.1.1 Safety and Accidents 
Safety is a very commonly used term. In the Oxford Dictionary, safety is defined as “the 
condition of being protected from or unlikely to cause danger, risk, or injury”. People have 
always been anxious about safety. Nevertheless, many catastrophic accidents have been 
causing people concern. Paradoxically, catastrophic accidents have been a major driver for 
the development of safety systems in the railway industry. Thus, catastrophic accidents 
accelerate the development of better safety systems, and the railway industry has become 
much safer than before (Wallace, et al., 2003). 
Even though the railway industry is becoming safer, catastrophic accidents still happen 
around the world. Typical examples are the Amagasaki derailment (2005) in Japan, the 
Santiago de Compostela derailment (2013) in Spain, the Eckwersheim derailment (2015) in 
France, the Bad Aibling train collision (2016) in Germany and the Croydon tram derailment 
(2016) in the UK. Such large accidents occurred despite the high level of safety systems in 
those countries. Therefore, further effort is required to ensure safety. 
Hollnagel (2014) argues that there are three approaches in safety thinking, the age of 
technology (until 1979), the age of human factors (until 1986) and the age of safety 
management (after 1986). In the age of safety management, organisational factors and safety 
culture are considered as important factors to secure safety. 
However, even the most efficient safety management systems (SMSs), which measure the 
risk of accidents and remove the causes of accidents before they happen, cannot completely 
prevent accidents. Even a perfect SMS could be breached by ‘human error’. The Amagasaki 
derailment (2005) in Japan, Santiago de Compostela derailment (2013) in Spain and 
Eckwersheim derailment (2015) in France were typical accidents caused by organisational 
failure that was compounded by human error and organisational culture in the railway 
industry. 
1.1.2 Safety Culture 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) focuses on human errors, which are regarded as an 
important factor that contributes to accidents and incidents (HSE, 1999). Human error has 
received substantial attention in research as a causal factor for a long time. Among the various 
approaches which have been tried to reduce the risk associated with human error, 
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constructing a good safety culture is considered an effective solution to prevent harmful 
events. 
Safety culture is defined as “the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies and patterns of behaviours” (HSC, 1993). Currently, the concept of safety 
culture is widely used in various industries, e.g., railway, aviation, nuclear power plant and 
healthcare, etc. A poor safety culture in an organisation can cause serious outcomes. Since 
the issue of safety culture first appeared in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) 
reports about the Chernobyl nuclear accident, safety culture has been counted as an 
important factor in the accident (IAEA, 1986), and a poor safety culture has frequently turned 
out to be an underlying cause in many serious accidents. 
In Britain’s railway industry, the concept of safety culture began to receive attention in the 
context of ensuring the safety of railways after the Clapham Junction collision in 1988 and the 
Ladbroke Grove collision in 1999 (Clarke, 1998; Cullen, 2001; Hidden, 1989). Deficiencies in 
the safety culture were identified as an underlying cause of the accidents (Clarke, 1998). 
Thereafter, Britain’s railway industry has been interested in the good safety culture in 
organisations, and has begun to work towards improving safety culture. An organisation’s 
safety culture is influenced by various factors from inside and outside the organisation. In 
general, safety culture is thought to be closely related to an informed culture. Reason (1997) 
equates safety culture with informed culture. Thus, developing effective reporting channels 
to collect safety knowledge from safety events is very important to improve an organisation’s 
safety culture (Reason, 1997; 1998). 
1.1.3 Safety Concern Reporting Scheme 
Reporting of accidents has been regarded as an important feedback method that provides 
clues to why accidents occur and how they can be prevented (Benn, et al., 2009). However, 
in some industries, including the railway industry, where the accident rate has fallen to a very 
low level, it is difficult to collect enough information from accidents. To solve the situation, 
safety information is collected from incidents as well. Analysis of reported incidents can 
provide useful information to prevent future accidents and improve the safety of 
organisations (Benn, et al., 2009; Wallace, et al., 2003). In many cases, similar patterns of 
incipient failures precede both accidents and incidents. Therefore, analysing sufficient 
incident data may provide more valuable support than focusing on a small number of isolated 
accidents. However, many incidents are not reported through official reporting channels due 
to a perceived blame culture or fear of disciplinary action (Davies, et al., 2000). ‘Under-
reporting’ of safety-related incidents is said to be a common problem in many industries 
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(Clarke, 1998). To overcome under-reporting, so-called confidential incident reporting 
systems (CIRSs), which ensure confidentiality of the so-called ‘reporters’ who report safety 
issues, have been adopted in some industries (Barach & Small, 2000; Davies, et al., 2000; 
Wallace, et al., 2003). Ensuring confidentiality promotes reporting of safety events because it 
reduces concerns about revealing the identity of those involved and the fear of being 
punished in relation to the incidents reported. Thus, CIRSs are operated in some industries, 
e.g., aviation, railways, nuclear power plants and healthcare. In particular, in the aviation 
industry, many countries have effectively operated CIRSs for a long time. 
1.1.4 Research Motivation 
In Britain’s railway industry, CIRSs have been recognised as an essential tool to improve 
railway safety. The Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis System (CIRAS) is the main 
CIRS in the UK railway industry, and complements other reporting systems, e.g., the Safety 
Management Information System (SMIS) and the Close Call System (CCS) which are designed 
and controlled by the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB). 
Despite this advantage, many countries have not yet adopted CIRSs in their railway industry 
because most of them are already operating other reporting channels. In the Korean railway 
industry, usually accidents are promptly reported through the internet, and systematic SMSs 
are in operation already. However, reporting of incidents is not that popular and CIRSs have 
not yet been adopted. The importance of perception of good safety culture is still at a 
relatively lower level than the overall safety level. 
So far, Korea’s railway industry has shown good performance in terms of railway operation 
and safety. However, assessment of safety culture is in the early stages in only a few train 
operating companies (TOCs), and infrastructure managers have not assessed the level of 
safety culture. Although concerns over under-reporting have continued to exist, the 
introduction of a CIRS has yet to be realised. 
Construction sites adjacent to operating railways have more risks than normal construction 
sites, and influence train operation. 
Thus, this thesis concentrated on Korea’s railway construction sites, which have not yet been 
researched. 
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1.2 Aim and Objectives 
The aim of the thesis is to improve Korea’s railway safety culture by changing the reporting 
culture. Currently, Korea’s railway shows good performance both in the quality and quantity 
of railway operation, and safety performance is also relatively good even compared with the 
28 European countries and various countries around the world. However, to further enhance 
the current level of safety, it is necessary to supplement the weaknesses of the existing safety 
system and strengthen the strengths. In this regard, research into the application of safety 
culture is necessary because people in Korea’s railway industry are not familiar with safety 
culture even though they have good SMSs. Therefore, the theme of this thesis will focus on 
safety culture. 
Currently, the concept of safety culture is not popular and is not even being emphasised in 
Korea’s railway industry. A measurement tool for railway safety culture was developed only 
in 2011 and has been applied only to several companies every year since then. The 
measurement of safety culture has been concentrated in the TOCs, and has not been 
conducted with railway infrastructure managers (IMs). Therefore, this thesis will focus on the 
railway construction field, which has not yet been subjected to measurement of safety culture. 
The author will conduct an assessment of the safety culture on railway construction sites. This 
aims to diagnose the level of safety culture and identify the need for improvements, and 
propose a practical way to improve railway safety culture. Innovation of reporting culture is 
necessary to develop safety culture. This is because the knowledge acquired through past 
experience becomes a powerful means of preventing future accidents. For this purpose, 
safety events are reported and analysed through various reporting systems. However, there 
are many cases where safety events are not reported because people are reluctant to report 
safety for many reasons. For example, these events might adversely affect their performance 
evaluations, or people might be concerned about being punished, etc. 
Therefore, measures should be taken to prevent from this happening. The author will review 
the need for the adoption of a CIRS, which is considered one of the most effective methods 
introduced to date for dealing with under-reporting.  
This will allow Korea’s railway industry to determine if a CIRS needs to be introduced 
separately from the existing reporting channels.  
Also, the author intends to design a CIRS model suitable for the Korean railway industry. The 
model aims to facilitate the smooth introduction of a CIRS for the Koran railways. 
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These are the detailed objectives of the thesis: 
• Review the concept of accidents and understand their causation. Distinguish between 
accident, incident and near miss, and find preventive measures; 
• Investigate safety culture by looking at the concept, origin, definition, components 
and assessment tools of safety culture, and find efficient methods; 
• Review the concepts and effectiveness of CIRSs, and research effective application of 
CIRSs; 
• Conduct case studies on the safety performance and safety culture of Korea’s railway, 
and on CIRSs in the UK and US; 
• Assess the perception of safety culture in Korea’s railway industry and review the 
necessity of adopting a CIRS as an additional reporting channel in Korea’s railway 
industry; 
• Analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the safety culture in Korea’s railway industry 
and examine the need to adopt a CIRS; 
• Identify important information about the operation of a CIRS; 
• Propose a CIRS model for Korea’s railway industry based on the results of literature 
reviews, case studies, questionnaire surveys and interviews. 
1.3 Scope 
This thesis concerns the introduction of a CIRS to improve railway safety in Korea. To do this, 
the author covers the safety culture necessary to improve the safety of railways, and includes 
a review of the reasons for the adaptation of a CIRS. 
The railway industry consists of various sectors, for example, construction, maintenance and 
operations. Much of the research on safety culture has been linked to railway operations, but 
research into the construction field is insufficient. Therefore, the scope of this thesis focuses 
on the railway construction sector. 
Currently, many railway constructions are being built near operating railways, and have a lot 
of influence on actual train operation, but there is insufficient research into this. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on the railway construction sites of the Korea Rail Network 
Authority (KR), which is responsible for construction and management of railway 
infrastructure for high-speed and conventional railways. The questionnaire survey and 
interviews were conducted at railway construction sites managed by KR; sites were selected 
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Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argue that combining quantitative and qualitative methods 
complements the strengths of each and overcomes weaknesses. To achieve the aim and 
objectives of the research, the author had to collect a wide range of numerical data on safety 
culture, which enabled quantification and generalisation of the safety culture level of 
organisations. Qualitative data was necessary to help to understand the underlying issues and 
opinions of frontline staff, enabling a deeper dive into the core of the research subject. 
Therefore, this thesis combined quantitative and qualitative data to optimise the strengths 
and mitigate the weaknesses of the methods. 
Based on the methodology, the UK, US and Korea were chosen to collect research data on 
while conducting the research. Korea was chosen as a data collection target because the main 
objective of this research was to enhance the railway safety culture of Korea. The UK was 
selected because the concepts of safety culture and CIRS are widely applied. The author 
selected the US as a research target because the US has introduced a CIRS to the railway 
sector systematically, though it has not yet been applied to the whole railway industry. 
After the data collection phase, further literature reviews were conducted to reinforce the 
information related to research subject. 
The subsequent phase involved comprehensive analysis of the information collected. In this 
phase, the information collected through case studies, interviews and questionnaire surveys 
was analysed to determine the matters necessary to configure the CIRS model for the Korean 
railway industry. 
The last phase was designed to address the research questions and to present the CIRS model 
through analysis of the information collected. Through these phases, data was collected and 
analysed which produced the answers to the research questions. 
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
Each chapter of this thesis contributes to achieve the purpose of the research. 
Each chapter was classified to effectively analyse the information acquired in the research 
process, and is composed of the following: 
• In Chapter 1, the author explains the background of the research topic, and sets the 
research aim and objectives. The methodology to effectively implement the research is 
presented; 
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• Chapter 2 deals with accidents and causation, and discusses preventive measures 
necessary to prevent accidents. As the definition of safety means no accident or hazard, 
it is first reviewed in this thesis; 
•  Chapter 3 deals with safety culture. As safety culture is not yet widely used in the 
Korean railway industry, the basic matters, origin, concept and definitions are 
comprehensively addressed. Furthermore, safety culture components and 
measurement techniques are presented; 
• Chapter 4 explains about CIRSs. There is a discussion of why information gained from 
accidents and incidents is useful, and the author presents important points of the 
concept and operation of CIRSs that can effectively handle this. Furthermore, it contains 
the accomplishments after CIRSs are introduced and the need to introduce a CIRS in the 
railway industry; 
• Chapter 5 provides the research questions of this thesis. The research questions to be 
posed are collected through a literature review; 
• Chapters 6 to 8 present the results of the research methods performed in order to 
resolve the research questions. Chapter 6 presents the result of the case studies. Safety 
performance and safety culture evaluation are reviewed, and the results of case studies 
of CIRAS in the UK and C3RS in the US, successful CIRSs in the world, are presented; 
• Chapter 7 is used to describe the questionnaire surveys conducted on railway 
construction sites in Korea. Through the preliminary survey and the results of the main 
survey, the author reviews the status of safety culture in Korea’s railway industry and 
the need to introduce a CIRS; 
•  Chapter 8 deals with interviews. The author selected a few sites and conducted 
interviews with people working in Korea’s railway industry to obtain a qualitative 
assessment of safety culture. The results of interviews with people in CIRAS are also 
presented. The results of the interviews were utilised when the author developed a CIRS 
model, and to find out important factors in the introduction and operation phase of 
CIRAS; 
• Chapter 9 is used to describe the Korea Confidential Incident Reporting System (KCIRS), 
a model for Korea’s railway industry. To establish the KCIRS model, important facets of 
KCIRS are presented, e.g., a framework for developing the KCIRS model, the scope of 
data collection, data process and securing confidentiality; 
• Chapter 10 is used to summarise the results of the research.  
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2 Accidents and Their Causation 
2.1 Definition of Accident, Incident and Near Miss 
‘Accident’ and ‘incident’ are words that are commonly used in everyday life. People read 
these words everyday through newspapers, TV programmes or the internet. Sometimes, the 
two words are used interchangeably and sometimes they are used with separate meanings. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, the definitions of accident and incident are as follows: 
“Accident is an unfortunate incident that happens unexpectedly and unintentionally, 
typically resulting in damage or injury” (Oxford University Press, 2017) 
“Incident is an instance of something happening” (Oxford University Press, 2017) 
However, HSE uses slightly different definitions to those of the dictionary. It defines ‘accident’ 
as “an event that results in injury or ill health” and ‘incident’ includes the concept of ‘near 
miss’ and ‘undesired circumstance’. A ‘near miss’ is defined as “an event that, while not 
causing harm, has the potential to cause injury or ill health”. And ‘undesired circumstance’ is 
defined as “a set of conditions or circumstances that have the potential to cause injury or ill 
health” (HSE, 2004, p. 4). 
Usually, the terms ‘incident’ and ‘near miss’ are used with the same meaning. Reason (1997, 
p. 118) defines ‘near miss’ as “any event that could have had bad consequences, but did not” 
and uses this as a term for ‘incident’. 
Sometimes the term ‘close call’ is also used, which means that it is similar to the terms ‘near 
miss’ and ‘incident’. The Oxford Dictionary defines close call as “a narrow escape from danger 
or disaster” (Oxford University Press, 2017). In the US, the term ‘close call’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘incident’, e.g., as in the Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS) 
(NASA, 2017). In the UK, Network Rail uses the term ‘close call’ and operates a CCS (RSSB, 
2017). In this, a close call “could be any unsafe act or unsafe condition that in different 
circumstances could have led to an accident or personal injury, or could have resulted in 
damage to property or equipment, but could not introduced risk to the railway infrastructure” 
(Network Rail, 2017). 
Although there are various terms and definitions, the author intends to use the terms and 
definitions of HSE in this thesis. 
Often, near misses and close calls are viewed as precursors to serious incidents and accidents 
(Barach & Small, 2000; Benn, et al., 2009; Clarke, 1998; Davies, et al., 2000; Langer, 2014; 
Reason, 1997; Wallace, et al., 2003). 
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2.2 Individual and Organisational Accidents 
Accidents can be classified according to different criteria. They can be divided into categories 
of causation and magnitude of damage. The diversity of these classifications is due to the 
different perspectives applied to accidents, as shown in Table 1 (Reason, 1998). However, 
sometimes it is not easy to distinguish between individual and organisational accidents 
because some accidents may have features of both types. One of the most important things 
is that organisational accidents have multiple causes associated with many people at different 
levels. On the other hand, individual accidents are caused by an individual or a limited group. 
These differences relate to the impact of an accident. While individual accidents have limited 
impact, organisational accidents can have far-reaching implications. Therefore, it is natural 
that Reason (1997) pays more attention to organisational accidents. 
Reason (1997) argues that organisational accidents are a product of recent times and 
technical innovations. This means that organisational accidents are influenced greatly by the 
ambient environment and conditions, i.e., organisational accidents are more complicated and 
more difficult to control than individual accidents, which have properties that have changed 
relatively little over time. 
Table 1. Characteristics of individual and organisational accidents (Reason, 1998) 
Distinction Individual accidents Organisation accidents 
Frequency Frequent Rare 
Consequence Limited Widespread 
Defences Few or no defences Many defences 
Cause Limited Multiple 
Occurrence Slips, trips and lapses Product of new technology 
History Short Long 
 
These days, safety systems are highly developed, and safety-related information is provided 
to people actively. Furthermore, as people become more aware of safety, individual accidents 
tend to decline significantly. However, although organisational accidents are less likely to 
occur, as the effects are still consistent, continuous research and response is still necessary. 
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understand why accidents happen. It is the perspective that safety reduces the number of 
adverse events, and tries to eliminate causes and improve barriers. 
On the contrary, Safety-II is interested in normal conditions, i.e., everyday work. It is the 
perspective that safety is the ability to succeed under changing conditions and uses most of 
the data available for learning (Hollnagel, 2014). 
The differences between Safety-I and Safety-II are shown below in Table 2. 
Hollnagel et al. (2015) present the methods for transition to Safety-II as follows: 
• Look for what goes right; 
• Focus on frequent events; 
• Remain sensitive to the possibility of failure; 
• Be thorough as well as efficient; 
• Invest in safety, focus on the gains from safety. 
Table 2. Comparison of Safety-I and Safety-II (Hollnagel, 2014) 
Item Safety-I Safety-II 
Definition of safety As few things as possible go wrong. As many things as possible go right. 
Safety management 
principle 
Reactive, respond when something 
happens, or is categorised as an 
unacceptable risk. 
Proactive, continuously trying to 




Accidents are caused by failure and 
malfunctions. 
The purpose of an investigation is to 
identify causes and contributory 
factors. 
Things basically happen in the same 
way, regardless of the outcome. 
The purpose of an investigation is to 
understand how things usually go 
right as basis for explaining how 
things occasionally go wrong. 
Attitude to the 
human factor 
Humans are predominantly seen as 
a liability or a hazard. 
Humans are seen as a resource 
necessary for system flexibility and 
resilience. 
Role of performance 
variability 
Harmful, should be prevented as far 
as possible. 
Inevitable but also useful. Should be 
monitored and managed. 
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However, Hollnagel et al. (2015) emphasise that Safety-I should not be completely replaced 
by Safety-II, but they should be combined. Because lots of harmful events are simple, they 
can be solved by the concept of Safety-I. If the concept of Safety-I does not work, it is 
necessary to adopt the concept of Safety-II (Hollnagel, et al., 2015). 
The concept of Safety-I and Safety-II gives a new direction to how to design safety systems. 
The concept of Safety-I and Safety-II expands the scope and opportunities of safety systems. 
In this regard, although existing safety systems were designed with the view of Safety-I, it is 
obvious that new safety systems should be designed with the view of Safety-II as well as 
Safety-I. 
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3 Safety Culture 
3.1 Organisational Culture 
There have been many studies of industrial accidents which show that particular 
characteristics of an organisation influence the occurrence of accidents. Among them, safety 
culture has received much attention. Safety culture, as a sub-facet of organisational culture, 
has a significant influence on people’s behaviours and attitudes and thus influences the safety 
performance of organisations (Reason, 1997; Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). 
Organisational culture has been studied by many researchers in general, but it has also been 
studied as an approach to reduce accidents and to improve safety in workplaces (Pidgeon & 
O'Leary, 2000; Silva, et al., 2004). As most human beings work in an organisation rather than 
on their own, improving safety performance requires that they accept their responsibilities 
to the organisation because its policies, conventions, etc., affect all individuals associated with 
its activities. 
In the Oxford Dictionary, culture is defined as “the ideas, customs, and sociology of society” 
(Oxford University Press, 2017). Although the term ‘culture’ is widely used in various fields, 
the understanding commonly used by anthropologists is different from that used by 
organisational specialists (Choudhry, et al., 2007). 
The definition of organisational culture has not been established clearly, but many 
researchers associate it with “shared behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and values” (Guldenmund, 
2000; Hudson, 2003; Reason, 1997). Schein (2004) uses the term organisational culture as “a 
pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns 
to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration”. Organisational 
culture is gradually associated with a single group but is created by all members of the 
organisation (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). However, although an organisation has a dominating 
culture, internally it can be expressed in various ways. In other words, there may be various 
subcultures. Many researchers argue that several different subcultures build up or appear in 
different functional groups, hierarchical levels and organisational roles in an organisation. 
These different subcultures can provide various perspectives and understanding of the 
different themes. Safety culture is also a subcomponent of organisational culture, which 
describes a safety level of organisations well (Clarke, 1999; Cooper, 2000; Harvey, et al., 2002; 
Hudson, 2007; Pidgeon, 1998). 
Many major accidents have been caused by complicated and unpredictable interactions 
among socio-technical components (Hollnagel, 2016; Toft, et al., 2012). Thus, a socio-cultural 
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perspective should be considered along with the technological perspective to avoid major 
accidents (Choudhry, et al., 2007; McDonald & Ryan, 1992; Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). 
Organisational safety culture is one of the expressions and characteristics of a company’s 
overall culture. Thus, the concept of safety culture is a useful method by which to judge an 
organisation’s position in terms of safety (McDonald & Ryan, 1992; Pidgeon, 1998). 
3.2 Concept of Safety Culture 
The concept of safety culture has existed since the 1980s. However, the term safety culture 
is known to have been used for the first time in the summary report of the International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) on the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 by the IAEA, and it 
was expanded in the Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants Safety series N75-INSAG-
3 in 1998 (IAEA, 1991; Cooper, 2000; Choudhry, et al., 2007). 
The Chernobyl disaster occurred during experiments period to test the design operation of 
the independent power supply in the case of the loss of external power sources (IAEA, 1986). 
At the time of the accident, many people died, and subsequent exposure to radioactive fallout 
resulted in the occurrence of various cancers in people who lived near the site. The IAEA cited 
poor safety culture as one of the reasons for the disastrous accident (IAEA, 1986). 
The concept of safety culture is that causes of accidents do not originate only from human 
errors, casual environmental conditions or technological failures, but also originate from 
more underlying issues in organisations, e.g., organisational policies, practices, etc. 
Since then, the concept of safety culture has been used in many areas, mainly centred on 
high-risk industries such as nuclear power plants, petroleum drilling, chemical plants, aviation 
and railways. Later, the notion of safety culture was adopted in the healthcare domain, which 
is also a high-risk and high-impact sector. The safety culture approach has also been actively 
introduced in the UK railway industry (Choudhry, et al., 2007; Cooper, 2000; Flin, 2007; 
Guldenmund, 2000; McDonald & Ryan, 1992; Reason, 1998). 
Thus, the concept of safety culture has regarded as a good tool with which to judge the 
dominance of organisations from a safety point of view (McDonald & Ryan, 1992). 
3.3 Definition of Safety Culture 
There are many definitions of safety culture in the literature. However, there is not yet an 
agreed definition, although most of the definitions are pretty similar to each other. 
The definition of safety culture which was presented by HSC’s Advisory Committee on the 
Safety of Nuclear Installations is one of most widely used definitions (HSE, 2005): 
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“The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment 
to, and the style and proficiency of, and organisation’s health and safety 
management. Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by 
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures.” 
(HSC, 1993) 
Also, many researchers have defined safety culture in various ways. Hale (2000) defines safety 
culture as “the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining norms 
and values, which determine how they act and react in relation to risks and risk control 
systems.” Guldenmund (2000) defines it as “those aspects of the organisational culture which 
will impact on attitudes and behaviour related to increasing or decreasing risk.” And Choudhry 
et al. (2007) explain that safety culture is “embedded in the organisation’s practices and 
safety management system.” 
Thus, although there are various views on the definition of what a safety culture is, it is certain 
that most of them focus on the thinking and behaviour related to safety, and safety culture is 
consistently coupled with the reality of organisations. Sometimes, the terms of safety culture 
and safety climate have been used interchangeably. 
However, at first, their meanings were different. The term safety climate appeared earlier 
than the term safety culture; the concept of safety climate was defined as “a summary of the 
workers’ perception about their safety and surroundings” (Zohar, 1980). Many researchers 
have noted that a safety climate relates to employees’ psychological shared perception of 
safety, and tends to be temporal and changeable (Zohar, 1980; Williamson, et al., 1997; Diaz 
& Cabrera, 1997). 
Other researchers explained that safety culture is concerned with real observable behaviours 
and it is unchangeable (Flin, 2007; Harvey, et al., 2002). However, a safety climate can be 
considered as one of measurable aspects of safety culture which is commonly measured by 
questionnaire survey and represents an important aspect of safety culture (Flin, 2007; Fang 
& Wu, 2013). 
Therefore, in this thesis the author intends to use the HSC definition (1993), which represents 
the characteristics of safety culture in this power. 
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3.4 Components of Safety Culture 
Reason (1997) explains that the function of safety culture is critical in safety management, 
and in order to acquire a positive safety culture, collecting, synthesising and utilising the right 
data is very important. To illustrate this, Reason (1997) divides safety culture into five 
subcomponents: informed culture, reporting culture, just culture, flexible culture and learning 
culture. 
Reason (1997) asserts that the focus of safety culture is in the building of safety information 
systems and all activities related to safety information, such as collecting, analysing, 
disseminating and utilising data; systems are connected with informed culture, i.e., he 
equates safety culture with informed culture. 
In addition, Reason (1997) presents four subcomponents to create an informed culture: 
reporting culture, just culture, flexible culture and learning culture. 
A reporting culture is defined by Reason as “an organisational climate where people are 
prepared to report their errors and near misses” (1997), which is an important factor in 
operating safety information systems effectively. To construct an effective reporting culture, 
management of blame is important. Blame has a profound effect on reporting rate. If blame 
is not managed, under-reporting will prevail. Under-reporting has been a matter of constant 
concern in many industries. Therefore, Reason (1997) asserts that just culture is necessary. A 
just culture is an atmosphere that encourages people to provide the right data related to 
safety. Reason (1997) stresses that there should be a clear standard to judge whether 
behaviour is acceptable or not. 
The term flexible culture is defined as an ability to adapt to changing circumstances (Reason, 
1997). 
Lastly, a learning culture is defined as “the willingness and competence to derive a proper 
conclusion from safety information systems and the will to implement large changes when it 
is needed.” Hence, Reason (1997) explains safety culture through safety information systems. 
Safety culture is composed of informed culture and four subcultures which are related to and 
interact with each other to create informed culture (Reason, 1997). 
Thus, safety culture is not intended to achieve any level of objectives that these subcultures 
are aiming to achieve, but is a continuously ongoing process. Reason (1997) explains that 
“safety culture is something that is striven for but rarely attained.” 
Indeed, Reason’s perception on safety culture is consistent with the fact that the highest level 
in the safety culture maturity model of HSE is ‘continually improving’. 
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3.5 Measurement of Safety Culture 
It is difficult to improve the safety culture of organisations; however, people have successfully 
improved safety culture through careful management. Halligan and Zecevic (2011) explain 
that safety culture has been improved via interventions, and present the following steps to 
engineer safety: 
• Step 1: Evaluate safety culture; 
• Step 2: Educate safety science; 
• Step 3: Identify safety concerns; 
• Step 4: Create partnerships between management and units; 
• Step 5: Continuously learn from safety deficiencies; 
• Step 6: Re-evaluate safety culture. 
Indeed, measurement of safety culture is important in improving safety culture. So far, 
various assessment tools have been adopted to evaluate safety cultures and safety climates. 
Some of them are specific assessment tools for particular industries; there are also general-
purpose tools for industries. 
HSE has reviewed safety culture measuring tools to create a safety culture measurement 
toolkit for ORR, which is intended to measure the safety culture of railways in the UK; the 
results are shown below in Table 3. 
As shown in Table 3, many tools are designed in questionnaire form and use a rating scale; 
the tools evaluate safety culture and have very similar indicators without distinction of 
industry: offshore, gas, nuclear power and railway industries. 
In the healthcare industry, Sammer et al. (2010) synthesised properties of safety culture from 
various works in the literature, grouped by the following seven items: leadership, teamwork, 
evidence-based, communication, learning, just and patient-centred. 
Indeed, many measurement tools of safety culture have very similar indicators without 
distinction of industry; in particular, emphasis on the indicators of leadership, reporting and 
communication has been highlighted in many aspects. 
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HSE Health and Safety Climate Survey Tool 
Safety 
climate 
Questionnaire (71 items) 
- Organisational commitment 
and communication 
- Line manager commitment 
- Supervisor’s role 
- Personal role 
- Workmates’ influence 
- Competence 
 
- Risk-taking behaviour and 
some contributory influences 
- Some obstacles to safe 
behaviour 
- Permit-to-work systems 




Aberdeen University Offshore Safety Questionnaire 
Safety 
climate 
Questionnaire (80 items) 
- General information 
- Communication 
- Involvement in safety 
 
- Satisfaction with safety 
activity 










- Communications about safety 
- Profile of safety within the 
organisation 
- Access to safety within the 
organisation 
- Recognition and openness 
about safety issues 
- Control over safety  
 
- Attitudes to safety 
- Safety information 
- Learning from safety issues 
- Perceptions of safety 
performance 
- Investment in safety 
- Other factors 
Railway 
industry 
Quest Evaluations and Databases Ltd Safety Climate Questionnaire 
Safety 
climate 
Questionnaire (319 items) 





- Design of work/people 
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Rail Safety and Standard Board (RSSB) Safety Culture Tool 
Safety 
culture 
Questionnaire (66 items) 
- Positive organisational 
attributes 
- Management commitment to 
safety 
- Strategic flexibility 




- Reinforcement and incentives 
- Individual ownership 
- Individual perceptions 
Railway 
industry 
Robert Gordon University Computerised Safety Climate Questionnaire 
Safety 
climate 
Questionnaire (49 items) 
- General information 
- Job (measuring self-reported risk-taking behaviour) 
- Safety attitudes (confidence in safety management; pressure for 
production; supervision and management; rules and regulations; 
safety on installation) 
Offshore 
industry 
The Loughborough University Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit (LSCAT) 
Safety 
climate 
Questionnaire (47 items) 
- Organisational content 
- Social environment 
- Individual appreciation 
- Work environment 
- Organisation specific factors 
Discussions 









- Management & organisational 
factors 
- Enabling activities 
- Individual factors 
Interview Nuclear, 
railway  
ORR’s HMRI Safety Culture Inspection Toolkit 
Safety 
culture 
Interview (6 scenarios) 
- Leadership 
- Two-way communication 
 
- Employee involvement 
- Learning culture 
Railway 
industry 
- Attitude towards blame  
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4 Confidential Incident Reporting Systems (CIRSs) 
4.1 Safety Information from Accidents and Incidents 
Reason (1997) equates safety culture and informed culture; he asserts that developing a 
safety information system is crucial to maintain a status of considerable wariness which 
gathers, analyses and shares information on safety events. Therefore, developing effective 
reporting channel is very important to improve an organisation’s safety culture. The reporting 
of accidents has been regarded as an important feedback channel that can provide insights 
into why accidents occur and how they can be prevented (Barach & Small, 2000; Davies, et 
al., 2000; Hudson, 2003; Wallace, et al., 2003; Benn, et al., 2009; Langer, 2014). 
In some industries, as the accident rate has fallen to very low levels, it is difficult to collect 
sufficient safety information from investigation of accidents. In response, a different type of 
safety information management system was created. An Incident reporting system seeks to 
obtain more safety data through the management of incidents that is more frequent than 
accidents (Clarke, 1998; Barach & Small, 2000; Wallace, et al., 2003). 
4.2  Concept of CIRSs 
Learning lessons from reported accidents and incidents within an organisational context 
depends entirely upon the continuous input of accidents and incidents data through voluntary 
submission of reports by frontline workers (Benn, et al., 2009). In many cases, major accidents 
are reported well, but minor accidents or incidents are often not reported (Clarke, 1998; 
Davies, et al., 2000). In order to prevent future accidents, it is required to collect the sufficient 
information not only major accidents but also minor accidents and incidents, which have been 
less reported. Barach and Small (2000) concludes that lack of information on accidents and 
incidents cause more severe consequence due to the fact that the risks cannot be mitigated 
by countermeasures. Therefore, focusing on incident data may add more valuable support to 
safety improvement than solely focusing on accidents. 
Many researchers have found out various reasons that restrain reporting incidents and 
accidents, e.g., blame culture, apathy, time constraints, etc. Above all things, it is difficult to 
encourage people to confess their own mistakes. Hence under-reporting is a common 
problem in many industries (Clarke, 1998; Benn, et al., 2009). To overcome under-reporting, 
some industries have adopted CIRSs which ensure confidentiality of the people who report 
safety issues, the so-called reporters. Ensuring confidentiality facilitates incident reporting; it 
diminishes concerns about revealing the identity of those involved and being punished in 
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connection with the incidents. Therefore, ensuring the confidentiality of reporters is critical 
in the operation of CIRSs; if a CIRS does not guarantee the confidentiality of reporters, the 
number of received reports decreases and the CIRS will be less used (Davies, et al., 2000). To 
ensure confidentiality of reporters, CIRSs are designed as anonymous or confidential systems 
with reporters. Of those, confidential systems are more common, because anonymity is not 
always possible or necessary (Barach & Small, 2000). 
4.3 Confidentiality and Anonymity 
Till now, various factors have been presented as facilitating reporting systems in many works 
in the literature. Among them, confidentiality is regarded as an exceedingly important 
element to promote reporting of incidents and to keep the system sustainable (Barach & 
Small, 2000; Benn, et al., 2009; Reason, 1997; 1998; Sexton, et al., 2000; Vincent, et al., 1999). 
Davies et al. (2000) demonstrate that incident reporting systems can be compromised by even 
a single event that betrays the confidence of the system, and the number of reports submitted 
could plummet. And Lucas (1991) argues if an incident reporting system does not secure 
anonymity, the system will quickly collapse. Moreover, Wallace et al. (2003) argue that CIRSs 
are more effective for collecting reports than non-confidential systems. Thus, confidentiality 
has a tremendous impact on the operation of incident reporting systems. 
For this reason, many reporting systems guarantee being either confidential or anonymous 
for reporters. According to the analysis of Barach and Small (2000), 10 of 12 incident reporting 
systems they reviewed guarantee confidentiality, and two systems provide anonymity. 
Among them, only one system does not provide confidentiality or anonymity. Thus, 
guaranteeing confidentiality is popular and provides anonymity. 
However, Barach and Small (2000) suggest that providing anonymity to reporters is only valid 
in the initial stages of incident reporting systems where it is needed to build trust, because it 
is difficult to guarantee anonymity and it is disadvantageous if additional information is 
needed on reports. Moreover, considering that there is a possibility that anonymity can be 
used for other purposes, such as harming a particular person or organisation, the application 
of anonymity should be considered prudently. Hudson (2003) demonstrates that the aviation 
industry found out that confidentiality is more important than anonymity for incident 
reporting systems. 
Therefore, providing confidentiality for reporters is essential for any incident reporting 
system, because every system needs a degree of follow-up control. However, it is sensible 
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that anonymity for reporters should be introduced only in specific cases, such as in the case 
of a reporting culture which has not been established. 
4.4 Introduction of CIRSs 
Nowadays, many incident reporting systems are being operated across various industries. 
CIRSs were first introduced in the aviation industry and were later expanded into other areas. 
In addition to the aviation industry, they are currently being operated in the railways, 
healthcare industry and so on. 
4.4.1 Aviation Industry 
In the aviation industry, many countries are operating a CIRS, including the UK’s Confidential 
Human Factor Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) and Mandatory Occurrence Reporting 
(MOR). The quality of incident reporting is excellent in the aviation industry. Incident 
reporting data has been used effectively to improve the efficiency of air traffic control, airport 
operation, pilot and attendant training and so on (Barach & Small, 2000; Davies, et al., 2000). 
Barach and Small (2000) argue that the immunity system for non-criminal offences had the 
greatest effect on facilitating the incident reporting process in the aviation industry. 
4.4.2 Healthcare Industry 
Although the healthcare industry was late in adopting CIRSs compared to other industries, 
i.e., aviation and railways, the operation of CIRSs is continuing to expand in the healthcare 
industry. Annually, a substantial number of patients are killed by preventable medical errors 
in hospitals; therefore, the safety regulator recommends the use of complementary 
mandatory and voluntary incident reporting systems to promote using lessons learned. 
Reporting incidents results in effective interventions, and decreases the possibility of future 
accidents (Barach & Small, 2000; Benn, et al., 2009; Itoh, et al., 2002). 
4.4.3 Railway Industry 
In the railway industry, safety information is collected, analysed and utilised systematically. 
Investigation into accidents and analysis of incidents have been conducted complementarily 
in a successful effort to improve railway safety. In the UK railway, reporting of safety-related 
information is mandated by means of the SMIS based on Railway Group Standard GE/RT8047 
‘Reporting of Safety Related Information’ to collect and analyse reliable safety data for use in 
risk management (Clarke, 1998; Davies, et al., 2000; Wallace, et al., 2003; Langer, 2014). 
The CCS is another reporting system used to collect a wider range of safety information. The 
term close call means ‘an unsafe act or an unsafe condition’ that can potentially cause injury 
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or damage (Network Rail, 2016). More precursors to potential accidents can be identified 
through the CCS. The ‘number of close calls’ and ‘close calls closed ratio within 28 days’ are 
used as performance indicators by Network Rail (2016). 
In addition, CIRAS complements SMIS and CCS. CIRAS started as a pilot programme by ScotRail 
in 1996 (Davies, et al., 2000; Langer, 2014). After the Ladbroke Grove collision (1999), CIRAS 
was expanded to all UK Railway Group members. Now, it deals with long standing safety 
issues on the whole railway industry in the UK (Langer, 2014). 
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5 Research Problem and Research Questions 
5.1 The Research Problem 
The purpose of this research is to eventually improve the safety of Korean railways. The 
author looked at the items necessary to improve the safety of the Korean railway industry 
through literature reviews. The Korean railway has continued to grow since its first railways 
in 1899, and since the opening of the world’s fifth high-speed railway in 2004, it operates an 
excellent railway system in qualitative and quantitative terms. The safety level of the Korean 
railway industry is relatively high, and the safety system is also systematically equipped. 
However, the author identified deficiencies in the safety sector through literature reviews. 
Most importantly, there is a lack of a strategic approach to safety culture. 
In developing safety, the Korean railway industry has focused on the systematisation and 
enhancement of SMSs. The government has introduced a national recognition system for 
SMSs to represent the technical level of SMSs in the country and to ensure that each railway 
company constructs an SMS beyond this standard. 
However, in this technical standard for railway safety, consideration of safety culture is not 
considered important. A strategic approach to safety culture is not being achieved. 
The measurement of safety culture is in the early stages of introduction, and railway workers 
are still unsure of the concept of safety culture. Also, improvements to the reporting system 
are needed, which is the most important factor in improving safety culture. 
Currently, various reporting systems are in use, but most reporting systems are focused on 
accidents. However, the current trend of safety culture is that safety systems take lessons not 
only from accidents but also from small safety concerns occurring every day. 
To do this, the support of a systematic reporting system is essential, but the Korean railway 
industry lacks measures to encourage reporting safety concerns and prevent under-reporting 
of accidents. 
Overall, the problems of safety management in Korea’s railway industry identified by the 
author are as follows: 
• Lack of awareness of safety culture, and safety culture level was yet not accurately 
evaluated for frontline staff; 
• Lack of strategic awareness of safety culture through measurement and 
supplementation of safety culture; 
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• Even though various kinds of reporting system for preventing future accidents have 
already been developed, they only focus on major accidents and are not interested in 
daily safety concerns; 
• It is not clear if the reporting systems are being operated efficiently; 
• The developmental direction of safety level is only intended to strengthen the SMSs. 
Together, these issues formed the research problem. 
5.2 Research Questions 
To develop research questions, the author carried out the following review on the problems 
listed above. There are several fields within the railway industry, and every field needs 
research into safety. However, the author limited the scope of this research to the railway 
construction sector because the scope of problem was wide and limits were unclear. 
Currently, even though there is much railway construction work near railways, affecting 
railway safety, research into the safety culture of the railway construction sector in Korea has 
not been conducted until now. This research will be the first investigation into the railway 
construction sites of Korea. 
The author expected the research to discover practical perceptions about the safety culture 
of Korea’s railway industry and to develop a standardised CIRS model which can be referred 
to in countries that do not yet operate CIRSs. 
To achieve these objectives, the author developed the following research questions to solve 
the research problems: 
• What are the Korean railway construction workers’ perceptions of safety culture? 
• Does the Korean railway industry need an additional reporting system? 
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The overall policies of the railway industry, including railway investments, are the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. In 2004, the Korean 
government implemented a structural reform of the railway system which separated railway 
facilities and operation. Thus, two monopolistic public corporations were established: KR, 
which is in charge of construction, improvements and asset management, and Korail, which 
is responsible for passengers, freight and maintenance. And, with the opening of the new 
high-speed railway, a new TOC, named SR, was established, which is a kind of public company 
as all shareholders are public entities. Therefore, all mainline railways are owned and 
operated by government-led public companies. 
Metros are being operated in six major cities in Korea, and they are owned and operated by 
public companies under the local governments. Light railway transits (LRTs) have been 
constructed recently to supplement the operation of the mainline railways and metros in 
urban areas. Though the LRTs are led by the local governments, they are built and operated 
by private operators, but this part of the network is far smaller than the mainline railways or 
metros. 
In addition, there are special-purpose railways, such as the airport railway for accessing 
Incheon Airport outside of Seoul, which separate independent entities operate independently 
of the private sector. 
The Korea Railroad Research Institute (KRRI) conducts railway research projects, and the 
Korea Transportation Safety Authority (KTSA) is in charge of railway safety. 
Railway standards are not handled by a specific institution like RSSB in the UK, but are divided 
separately into several institutions according to each role in the railway industry. 
As a result, the Korean railway industry consists of a simple structure with only small numbers 
of public institutions responsible for facilities, operations and metros. 
6.1.2 Analysis of Safety Performance of Korea’s Railway Industry 
There are several ways to evaluate the safety performance of railways. While many indicators 
related to safety have been developed and used, there are not many indicators commonly 
applied on the railway industries across the world. 
The author would like to compare Korea’s railway safety performance with European 
countries that have a high level of railway safety performance. In order to do so, it is necessary 
to use safety indicators widely used in railway industries. 
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The European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) issues the biennial Railway Safety 
Performance Report that is intended to monitor the safety performance of the railways of the 
European Union (ERA, 2016). In the report, ERA uses Common Safety Indicators (CSIs), i.e., 
significant accidents, deaths and serious injuries, precursors of accidents, economic impact of 
accidents, etc., to collect information, which makes comparative analysis possible. Among 
them, the author will use ‘fatalities per million train-km’ and ‘accidents per million train-km’ 
in this thesis, because those indicators are the most widely used and are relatively simple to 
compare (ERA, 2016). The actual data for these indicators can be obtained from the European 
Railway Accident Information Link (ERAIL) system which is operated by ERA (ERA, 2017). The 
KTSA provides railway safety performance data through the Railway Accident and Safety 
Performance Report which is the annual safety analysis report including these indicators 
(KTSA, 2014; 2016). 
The author compared the railway safety performance of Korea and eight European countries, 
i.e., UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, using two safety 
indicators: ‘fatalities per million train-km’ and ‘accidents per million train-km’. The author 
chose the eight countries with a high level of safety in the railway industry among the 28 
countries of the European Union (EU). 
Data was obtained from ERA’s ERAIL system and KTSA’s Railway Accident and Safety 
Performance Report. Although the ERAIL system provides various performance indicators for 
safety, the KTSA Safety Performance Report provides fewer safety indicators, and the criteria 
for classifying data are different from each other, thus the author only chose the two 
indicators. 
6.1.2.1 Accidents on Railways 
Accidents per million train-km is an objective indicator to represent the safety level of railways. 
For the indicator, Korea and the eight EU countries showed a relatively high level of safety. In 
particular, the numbers in Korea have dropped dramatically over the past 7 years, as shown 
in Figure 7. 
Korea’s accidents per million train-km dropped from 1.390 in 2009 to 0.520 in 2015. All eight 
EU countries showed a lower incidence of accidents than Korea. Though Austria showed a 
relatively higher accident rate than the other selected EU countries and the figures continue 
to fluctuate, the accident rate in Austria (0.504) was lower than that in Korea (0.520) in 2015. 
In 2015, the other seven EU countries had fewer than half the figure for Korea, ranging from 
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Although Korea’s railway posted very similar values to the eight EU countries for fatalities per 
million train-km, it showed much higher values for accidents per million train-km. 
Korea’s number of fatalities per million train-km has decreased continuously from 0.310 in 
2009 to 0.120 in 2015, as shown in Figure 8. 
In 2015, the figure for Korea was lower than those for Germany (0.125), Italy (0.135) and 
Austria (0.223); however, it was still high compared to those for the UK (0.073) and 
Switzerland (0.040). The other six countries maintained similar levels in the same period, 
because they had already reached the highest level of railway safety among all 28 EU 
countries. 
In Figure 8, it can be seen that the value for Spain rose significantly in 2013, reflecting the 
impact of the Santiago Compostela derailment accident in which 79 people were killed. 
Normally, although there are a relatively low number of fatalities in the railway industry, it is 
one of the high-risk industries. There are always fears that catastrophic accidents like the one 
in Spain will happen at any time. 
Therefore, while Korea’s railway industry has a relatively low incidence of fatalities, it is 
necessary to improve safety levels in order to reduce the risk of serious accidents, considering 
the incidence of high accidents. 
6.1.3 Safety Culture of Korea’s Railway Industry 
The concept of safety culture has recently been adopted by the Korean industry. Initially, it 
was applied to high-risk industries e.g., nuclear power plants and chemical plants, and then it 
began to be applied to the railway and healthcare industries (Lee, et al., 2014). Through this 
case study, the author conducted research about adoption and measurement of safety 
culture in Korea’s railway industry. 
6.1.3.1 Adoption of Safety Culture in Korea’s Railway Industry 
The concept of safety culture has not yet been properly established in Korea’s railway industry. 
However, the Korean government included the concept of safety culture when it developed 
the approval process for railway SMSs (Lee, et al., 2011). 
Legislation for the approval process for railway SMSs was imposed on IMs and TOCs for the 
systematic safety management of railways in 2014. In order to implement the legislation, the 
Korean government established safety management structure technical standards (MOLIT, 
2014). 
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Since then, every railway IM and TOC in Korea operates under the government’s approval for 
its SMS, based on the safety management structure technical standards. Through the 
legislation, the overall level of SMSs has been enhanced because all railway companies have 
established systematic SMSs that go further than the technical standards proposed by the 
Korean government. 
According to the technical standards (MOLIT, 2016), the railway safety management structure 
is composed of three parts: railway SMS, train operating system (TOS) and railway 
maintenance system (RMS). SMS is again subdivided into 10 detailed areas as shown in Table 
4. 
Table 4. Safety management structure technical standards (MOLIT, 2016) 




Safety management SMS, management policy, safety 
objective, safety plan, review of safety 
management, roll and responsibility 
Documentation Documentation and management 
Risk management Risk evaluation and management, 
countermeasures, change management 
Requirement management Requirement elicitation, change 
management, compliance 
Accident investigation  Reporting, investigation, 
countermeasures 
Internal inspection Evaluation, inspection and monitoring, 
result management 
Emergency response Emergency response plan, training, 
cyber terror 
Education and training Human resources programme, 
education and training 
Safety information Management of safety information, 
safety assurance programme 
Safety culture Safety leadership, improvement of 
safety culture 




Train operation management system 
Railway maintenance 
system (RMS) 
Maintenance Maintenance management system 
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The technical standards recommend the creation and implementation of executive safety 
leadership, and require companies to establish and to implement safety culture improvement 
programmes (MOLIT, 2016). However, since the policy is in its early stage, measurement and 
improvement activities for the railway safety culture have not been yet actively implemented. 
The interest in safety culture emerged much earlier than the legislation for the approval 
process of railway SMSs. Actually, in 2011, KTSA launched a research programme to develop 
a railway safety culture assessment tool which is composed of five indicators and measures 
safety culture by means of a questionnaire survey (Lee, et al., 2011). 
The questionnaire survey comprises six scenarios and links to five safety culture indicators as 
shown in Table 5. The scenarios are designed to help ensure that safety culture is accurately 
measured through familiar events or processes in the workplace (Lee, et al., 2014; Lee, et al., 
2011). 
Table 5. Relationship between KTSA’s scenarios and indicators (Lee, et al. (2011)) 
Scenario of KTSA’s questionnaire survey Indicators of safety culture 
1. Safety management 1. Safety policy and safety leadership 
2. Communication between concerned parties 
5. Safety responsibility mind 
2. Occurrence of safety concerns 2. Communication between concerned parties 
4. Learning culture 
5. Safety responsibility mind 
3. Change management 2. Communication between concerned parties 
3. Change management and self-diagnosis 
4. Transfer of information relating to shift 
duties 
2. Communication between concerned parties 
5. Safety responsibility mind 
5. Time-critical and degraded situations 1. Safety policy and safety leadership 
3. Change management and self-diagnosis 
4. Learning culture 
5. Safety responsibility mind 
6. Accident management 1. Safety policy and safety leadership 
4. Learning culture 
5. Safety responsibility mind 
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KSTA’s questionnaire survey consists of 43 questions and each answer is calculated to 
quantify the safety culture by awarding it a score based on a five-point Likert scale (1 to 5) 
(Son, et al., 2015). 
The results of the survey are ranked into five categories as shown in Table 6. 
Measurement of safety culture in Korea’s railway industry has been carried out once a year 
by KTSA across the whole railway industry in Korea. Usually, KTSA gets replies from fewer than 
200 people which is quite a small number considering the scale of Korea’s railway industry. 
Furthermore, KTSA does not differentiate between sites or companies when analysing the 
results (Lee, et al., 2016; Lim & Kim, 2014; Son, et al., 2015). 
Table 6. KTSA’s decision criteria for safety culture level (Lee, et al., 2011) 
Category Description of category Description of company attitudes 
Level 1 Not yet Only carries out mandatory requirements, responses 
to laws, and transfers all responsibilities to the safety 
departments 
Level 2 Safety operation 
procedure (SOP) only 
Safety norms and procedures are established but not 
distributed to all employees 
Level 3 SOP & 
education/communication 
Safety norms and procedures are established and 
education is provided for employees, but compliance 
is not ensured 
Level 4 SOP & practice/promotion Safety norms and procedures and established and 
complied with, incentive and punishments an applied, 
but safety education is not provided to employees 
Level 5 SOP, 
education/communication 
& practice/promotion 
All put importance on safety management, consider 
peer safety, safety norms and procedures run well, 
safety education is provided properly, and employees 
comply with requirement 
 
6.1.3.2 Measurement of Safety Culture in Korea’s Railway Industry 
Measurement of the safety culture in Korea’s railway industry has been conducted once a 
year by KTSA since it developed the measurement tool in 2011 (Lee, et al., 2014; Lee, et al., 
2011; Lee, et al., 2016; Son, et al., 2015). Measurement is conducted using a web-based tool 
with workers in about ten train TOCs in Korea. 
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KTSA uses a questionnaire survey system in the Rail Safety Information System (RSIS). 
However, despite the operational convenience of the electronic survey system, the number 
of survey respondents is extremely limited. In the measurement of Korea’s railway safety 
culture in 2015, only 184 people took part in the survey out of the 677 people targeted. 
Among the respondents, 67.4% were frontline workers and the rest worked at headquarters. 
The biggest group of respondents worked as drivers (28.8%), the next biggest in safety areas 
(14.1%) (Lee, et al., 2016). The number of respondents was too small to be representative of 
the whole Korean railway industry. It is necessary to increase the reliability of measurement 
by increasing the number of measurement targets. 
Table 7 illustrates all the results of safety culture measurement for Korea’s railway industry 
since 2011 (Lee, et al., 2016; Son, et al., 2015). 
Table 7. Results for Korea’s railway safety culture (Lee, et al., 2016; Son, et al., 2015)  





















Safety policy and 
safety leadership 









70.1% 76.9% 83.1% 81.8% 79.3% 81.6% 83.0% 83.2% 74.7% 81.2% 




75.6%** 79.6%** 88.6%** 84.8%** 86.2%** 84.2%** 89.4%** 86.1% 79.1%** 83.3%** 
Total 73.0% 78.8% 84.1% 82.7% 79.9% 81.4% 84.5% 83.9% 74.8% 81.7% 
* Minimum value; ** maximum value 
 
As seen in Table 7, the results for safety culture are calculated in two ways, according to both 
‘positive answer’ and ‘average point’. Although all the indicators fluctuated, the lowest 
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questionnaire survey has been very small compared to the number working in Korea’s railway 
industry. 
Indeed, the number is insufficient to represent the tens of thousands of employees in Korea’s 
railway industry. Furthermore, many of the respondents’ working disciplines were 
concentrated in certain areas, e.g., train driver, safety management, maintenance of 
infrastructure, etc. Also, the subculture of individual companies or sites has not yet been 
studied, and there has been a lack of research into the differences between the results and 
the actual level of safety culture at sites. 
However, KTSA first measured Korea’s railway safety culture and has continued to accumulate 
data related to safety culture (Lee, et al., 2014; Lee, et al., 2011; Lee, et al., 2016; Son, et al., 
2015). 
Thus, it is certain that it will help to identify vulnerable areas and to improve the overall 
railway safety culture of Korea through improvements of those areas. 
From this point of view, ‘safety policy and safety leadership’, which has shown relatively low 
values compared to other indicators in the measurements, and ‘learning culture’, which 
sharply declined in the recent measurement, must be improved as soon as possible. 
6.1.4 Findings for Korea’s Railway Safety Performance and Safety Culture 
The case study for Korea’s railway industry was carried out to identify the actual level of safety 
performance and safety culture. 
The safety performance level of Korea’s railway industry was found to have a similar level of 
safety compared to the eight major European countries in terms of accidents and fatalities. 
In particular, it is positive that the safety performance has continually improved: 
• Although Korea’s accident per million train-km dropped sharply from 1.390 in 2009 to 
0.520 in 2015, the value was slightly higher than major EU countries; 
• Korea’s fatalities per million train-km dropped from 0.310 in 2009 to 0.120 in 2015; the 
value was similar to those of major EU countries. 
However, there was a lot of lack of respect for safety culture. There was not only a lack of 
awareness about safety culture, but also a lack of measurement and utilisation of safety 
culture. The results for safety culture measurement were relatively low and have fluctuated 
continually: 
• The average point for Korea’s safety culture increased from 78.8% in 2011 to 81.7% in 
2015, but the values fluctuated in the process; 
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• Positive answers about Korea’s safety culture increased from 73.0% in 2011 to 74.8% in 
2015, but the values fluctuated much more than the average point; 
• Korea’s safety level was level 4 out of five levels in 2015. 
Therefore, improvement of safety culture is necessary to secure railway safety in Korea. As a 
result of the case study for Korea’s railway safety performance and safety culture, the 
following lessons were found: 
• Safety performance has steadily improved and has approached a similar level of safety 
to that of major EU countries; 
• Safety culture needs continuous efforts to be improved because the results were not at 
a good level and have fluctuated recently; 
• There was a lack of awareness about safety culture; 
• The safety culture indicators of ‘safety policy and safety leadership’ and ‘learning 
culture’ need to be improved in particular. 
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6.2 CIRS in the UK: CIRAS 
6.2.1 Background 
CIRAS began as a two-year pilot programme in the UK in 1996. The University of Strathclyde 
developed a confidential reporting system for ScotRail, and later other railway organisations 
in Scotland participated in the system. As a result of the Ladbroke Grove rail collision (1999), 
CIRAS was expanded to apply to all mainline railways in Great Britain (Davies, et al., 2000). 
Currently, membership of CIRAS stands at thousands of companies, as subcontractors of 
Network Rail participate in CIRAS (Langer, 2014). 
The purpose of CIRAS is to promote ongoing safety improvements by collecting safety 
information and issues from the railway industry, analysing and resolving them, and sharing 
the lessons learned from the processes with all people involved. 
In this scheme, it is key that people are able to provide more information and report issues 
without fear of being punished by ensuring confidentiality of ‘reporters’ who report safety 
issues. CIRAS has various defences at every part of the process to secure confidentiality, 
because confidentiality can determine its success. For this reason, CIRAS is being operated 
independently. CIRAS was designed to solve the issue that people did not want to report 
human factor problems through official channels because of a fear of blame or punishment, 
and many people who are disappointed with their internal reporting system use CIRAS as well. 
6.2.2 Safety Concerns to Report 
CIRAS handles various safety concerns related to the transportation industry, which is wide 
open. Any concerns about health and safety in the workplace can be reported to CIRAS. 
CIRAS (2017) describes that the following safety concerns are treated: 
• Unsafe practices; 
• Work environment issues; 
• Failure to follow procedures; 
• Lack of training or qualifications to do a particular task; 
• Lack of safety briefings; 
• Community safety; 
• Fatigue; 






























Report to CIRAS about safety concerns
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Contact with reporter confidentially
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CIRAS demands the reporting of a wide range of topics, to acquire and share safety-related 
knowledge on various topics. Key lessons learned through the case study are: 
• CIRAS handles a wide range of safety topics related to the transportation industry, 
including any concerns about health and safety in the workplace; 
• Confidentiality has been the most important value of CIRAS and is ensured by various 
methods in the operation processes; 
• As a complementary reporting channel, CIRAS has solved many issues that had not 
been solved by existing reporting channels. 
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6.3 CIRS in the US: C3RS 
6.3.1 Background 
In 2002, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) noted that there had been no 
improvement in human factor-caused accident level at that time, and decided to introduce a 
new approach to safety in 2003 that had already proven to be successfully in the aviation, 
nuclear power and chemical industries. After two years, FRA signed a memorandum of 
understanding with stakeholders for the pilot programme of C3RS (Morell, et al., 2006; Ranney, 
et al., 2015). 
After preparation, C3RS started at the first site in 2007. Overall, four companies participated 
in the pilot programme: Union Pacific (UP), Canadian Pacific (CP), New Jersey Transit (NJT) 
and Amtrak. Currently, eight companies participate in the C3RS programme, and over 21,000 
employees are eligible to report safety concerns through it (Morell, et al., 2006; Ranney, et 
al., 2015) . 
From the start, FRA has conducted evaluations of the C3RS programme to assess outcomes. 
Its applicability to the entire US railway industry will depend on the outcome of this 
assessment (Ranney & Raslear, 2012; 2013; 2015; Ranney, et al., 2015). 
6.3.2 Close Call Events 
C3RS deals with close call events confidentially using a Peer Review Team (PRT). The term 
close call is defined as “an opportunity to improve safety practices in a situation or incident 
that has a potential for more serious consequence” (FRA, 2005; Ranney, et al., 2015). 
FRA (2005) demonstrated examples of close calls as: 
• Events of high frequency but minor consequence; 
• Events of low frequency but which have potentially major consequences; 
• Events that are below the FRA reporting threshold; 
• Events that are above the FRA reporting threshold where the potential exists. 
However, C3RS is only applicable to sites signing up with FRA, and it is not applicable to other 
sites. 
6.3.3 Protection for Reporters 
C3RS operates a protective system to ensure that reports are not missed due to concerns 
about punishment. Under this system, reporters can be exempted from discipline even 
though they are related to close calls. 
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For protection, FRA (2005) provides that the following conditions should be met:  
• The employee did not intend to cause damage; 
• The employee reported the unsafe condition within time limits (48 hours). 
However, not all reports are subject to protection. FRA (2005) says that no protection is 
provided for workers in the following conditions: 
• The employee’s action was intended to damage; 
• The employee’s action involved a criminal offence; 
• The employee’s action was related to substance abuse; 
• The report contains falsified information; 
• Railroad accidents/incidents; 
• The events resulted in identifiable release of hazardous material; 
• The event was observed in real time and reported. 
Even if workers have safety concerns, sometimes they do not report them because of 
inconvenience, indifference or fear of being punished. Therefore, the protection system for 
reporters is considered a very positive measure to help activate reporting of safety concerns. 
6.3.4 Operational Process 
Ensuring confidentiality of reporters is the first priority in the C3RS operating process. To do 
this, a neutral third party, i.e., NASA, is involved between reporters and PRTs. 
While operating C3RS, NASA provides PRTs with ‘balanced reports’; all personal information 
is removed from data to prevent leakage of personal information after the issue is solved. 
The detailed operating process of C3RS is shown in Figure 16. 
The C3RS process comprises six stages (Ranney, et al., 2015): 
1) If a worker observes a close call event, he or she reports it to C3RS via website or mail; 
2) A C3RS analyst interviews the worker by call to clarify or obtain additional information, 
and sanitises identifying data from the report to ensure confidentiality; 
3) C3RS sends the de-identified report to the PRT; 
4) PRT reviews the report, determines the root causes and recommends corrective 
actions to the Support Team; 
5) Corrective actions are reviewed, evaluated and implemented; 
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Thus, a systematic evaluation was prepared to assess the effectiveness of C3RS, and was 
conducted by the Volpe National Transportation System Center. 
6.3.6.1 Purpose of the Evaluation 
Raslear et al. (2008)and Ranney et al. (2015) demonstrated the purpose of the evaluation of 
C3RS. It comprises three aspects: 
• Implementation Evaluation evaluates how well it is being implemented; 
• Outcome Evaluation evaluates the influence of C3RS on safety and safety culture; 
• Sustainability Evaluation evaluates how to maintain the programme in the long term. 
6.3.6.2 Methods of Evaluation 
For the systematic evaluation of C3RS, Ranney et al. (2015) use an evaluation methodology to 
accomplish the purpose of evaluation, as shown in Table 8. 
For every company adopting C3RS, a C3RS site and a non-C3RS site were chosen together as 
evaluation targets to evaluate the effectiveness of C3RS by comparison. 
The evaluation is designed to be executed according to the progress of the programme, i.e., 
baseline, midterm and final points of the programme. Since a measurement was conducted 
as a baseline prior to the application of the C3RS, it is possible to compare it with the 
subsequent measurements. 
Table 8. Evaluation methodology (adapted from Ranney, et al. (2015)) 
Type Company Site Programme Phase 
Freight UP C3RS site Baseline, Midterm, Final 
Non-C3RS site Baseline, Midterm, Final 
CP C3RS site Baseline, Midterm, Final 
Non-C3RS site Baseline, Midterm, Final 
Passenger NJT C3RS site (whole sites) Baseline, Midterm, Final 
Amtrak C3RS site Baseline, Midterm, Final 
Non-C3RS site Baseline, Midterm, Final 
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6.3.6.3 Data Collection for Evaluations 
The following qualitative and quantitative data is used for evaluation of C3RS (Ranney, et al., 
2015): 
• Railway safety culture survey: evaluation of implementation and outcomes; 
• Interviews: implementation, outcome, sustainability; 
• C3RS reporting rates: implementation, sustainability; 
• Project records: implementation, outcome, sustainability; 
• Field notes: implementation, outcome, sustainability; 
• Corporate safety data: outcome. 
6.3.6.4 Results of Evaluations 
The Volpe centre have conducted the evaluation process since the adoption of C3RS in 2007, 
and most evaluation results were positive (Ranney & Raslear, 2012; 2013; 2015; Ranney, et 
al., 2015). 
The results of the evaluations are as follows: 
Site A: 
Ranney and Raslear (2012) show the evaluation results for a site 2 years after adoption of 
C3RS as below: 
• Car movement between incidents improved about 31%; 
• Labour–management relationships and peer-to-peer relationships improved; 
• Discipline cases were dramatically decreased by over 90%. 
Site B: 
Ranney and Raslear (2013) demonstrated the evaluation results for another site 2 years after 
adoption of C3RS as shown below: 
• Derailments caused by run-through switches decreased by 50%; 
• Labour–management relationships improved. 
Site C: 
Ranney and Raslear (2015) revealed the evaluation results for another site 4.75 years after 
adoption of C3RS as shown below: 
• Human-factored derailment decreased by 31%; 
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• Decertification of workers decreased by 41%; 
• Human-factored incident costs reduced by 53%; 
• Labour–management relationships and labour-to-labour communication improved. 
As a result, it was found that adoption of C3RS is beneficial in improving not only safety but 
also safety culture. 
However, these types of evaluation are very complicated and time-consuming, although they 
may be very beneficial and essential in the early age of adoption. Therefore, these detailed 
third-party evaluation systems are difficult to enforce if conducted in the long term. Therefore, 
it is recommended that a permanent evaluation system with some easy methods, apart from 
comprehensive evaluation programmes in adoption stages, should be adopted to proceed 
with continued improvement. 
6.3.7 Findings from the Case Study of C3RS 
The case study for C3RS was conducted to identify the overview and functionalities of C3RS 
and to capture the key points in the operation process. 
C3RS began in 2007 in the US, and currently only applies to eight railway companies. While 
the scope of application is expanding gradually, only a small part of the US railway industry 
applies it. 
C3RS provides official legal protection, so reporters are protected from discipline, 
decertification and enforcement by FRA under certain conditions, and it ensures the 
confidentiality of reporters in various ways. Problem-solving in C3RS is led by independent 
PRTs, which were established by each company and include specialists from various sectors. 
Since C3RS has been introduced in accordance with the systematic planning of analysis of 
previous cases, it has a comprehensive evaluation programme. The results of the evaluation 
programme show that safety and safety culture has been improved qualitatively and 
quantitatively: 
• Labour–management relationships, labour–labour communication and relationships 
improved; 
• Discipline cases decreased by over 90%; 
• Derailments cause by run-through switches decreased by 50%; 
• Human-factored derailments decreased by 31%; 
• Decertification of workers decreased by 41%; 
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• Human-factored incident costs reduced by 53%; 
• Car movement between incidents improved by about 31%. 
As a result, the application of C3RS has positively influenced safety culture and safety 
performance. Key lessons learned through the case study are: 
• The application of C3RS is beneficial for improving safety and safety culture; 
• The protection system for reporters helps employees to report actively; 
• PRTs are important entities in solving the problems; 
• The evaluation system is beneficial to verify the effectiveness of C3RS. 
6.4 Lessons for Model Development 
The case studies were conducted in order to verify the safety level of Korea’s railway industry 
and to check the structure and effectiveness of CIRSs. 
The safety level was considered by reviewing safety performance indicators. Recently, safety 
performance in Korea has reached a similar level to that of major EU countries. On the other 
hand, safety culture has been found to remain at a relatively low level of awareness and 
utilisation, and more improvement is needed in some areas of safety culture. 
The case studies of CIRSs were conducted through examining actual practice in the UK and 
US. These were conducted to identify issues for creating a CIRS model. CIRAS is well operated 
as a complementary reporting channel, and the benefits of C3RS have been proved through a 
comprehensive evaluation programme. 
Through the case studies, the author identified some lessons and issues for developing a CIRS 
model: 
• Safety performance in Korea’s railway industry has steadily improved and has reached 
a similar level of safety to that of major EU countries, but safety culture should be 
improved more; 
• Application of CIRSs is beneficial for improving safety and safety culture; 
• Confidentiality is the most important value and has helped people to report actively; 
• As a complementary reporting channel, CIRAS has solved many issues that had not been 
solved by existing reporting channels; 
• The scope of reporting coverage should be broadened to collect information on various 
topics of safety concern; 
• Evaluation systems are beneficial to verify the applicability of CIRSs. 
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7 Questionnaire Surveys 
The questionnaire surveys were conducted to measure the safety culture in Korea’s railway 
industry, with a view to introducing a CIRS to Korea’s railway industry. Although Korean TOCs 
have measured safety culture since 2011, railway construction sites, which might significantly 
influence railway safety, have not yet measured safety culture. Therefore, these 
questionnaire surveys focused on railway construction sites. 
The questionnaire surveys were conducted in two phases. 
The first survey was conducted to assess the reporting culture of the railway construction 
sites prior to the full-scale survey on safety culture, and was intended to determine whether 
additional reporting channels are needed to improve safety culture. 
The second survey explored the safety culture of the railway construction sites and was 
intended to provide exact information on the need for an additional reporting channel based 
on the first survey. 
As the safety culture of railway construction sites has not yet been measured, the 
questionnaire surveys are the first practical surveys of safety culture in Korean railway 
construction sites. 
7.1 Preliminary Questionnaire Survey 
7.1.1 Purpose 
The preliminary questionnaire survey was conducted to discover Korean railway engineers’ 
and supervisors’ perception of reporting cultures. For this purpose, the questionnaire 
consisted of items related to the reporting of safety concerns. 
Through this questionnaire survey, the author wanted to roughly understand the reporting 
culture of railway construction sites and to confirm the need for further detailed surveys. 
Moreover, the author wanted to review the possibility of under-reporting to identify whether 
additional reporting channels are needed. 
7.1.2 Preliminary Questionnaire Survey Methods 
7.1.2.1 Survey Items 
The preliminary questionnaire survey included items on position, reporting scheme for safety 
concerns, reporting culture for safety concerns and under-reporting. All questions were 
multiple choice, apart from one open-ended question about under-reporting. 
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The questions were established through a literature review on reporting culture (HSE, 2005). 
The draft questionnaire was reviewed by an expert in incident reporting systems. 
 
Position 
The first question in the preliminary questionnaire survey asked each respondent to identify 
their position. The author did not include any items related to personal information, to ensure 
the confidentiality of respondents, but included their position in order to conduct analysis 
according to position. There were four categories of position: 
• Site managers; 
• Supervisors; 
• Site engineers; 
• Manual workers. 
 
Reporting Scheme for Safety Concerns 
This item consists of two questions related to reporting scheme and operation of the scheme. 
Through this item, the author wanted to identify how reporting schemes were being operated. 
All questions had Yes/No answers. 
 
Reporting Culture of Safety Concerns 
This item was the main item of the survey and aimed to identify the reporting culture of 
respondents. The part comprised seven questions and was developed to measure four sub-
items as shown below. All questions were multiple choice type, using a five-point Likert scale 
whereby 1 represented ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 represented ‘strongly agree’. 
• Leadership: two questions; 
• Two-way communication: two questions; 
• Learning culture: one question; 
• Attitude towards blame: two questions. 
 
Under-reporting 
This item comprised two questions and was developed to identify the facilitation measure for 
reporting and the reasons for under-reporting. One question was multiple choice and the 
other was open-ended. 
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7.1.2.2 Survey Target 
As it was a preliminary survey, the author selected 15 sample sites near operating railways 
among about 350 railway construction sites in Korea. Table 9 shows the target sites and staff. 
At each target site, five people were selected for survey. 
Table 9. Target of preliminary questionnaire survey (The author) 
Target Total Civil Track Building Signal Communi-
cation 
Electricity 
Site 15 8 3 1 1 1 1 
Staff 75 40 15 5 5 5 5 
7.1.2.3 Survey Administration 
The questionnaire survey was conducted between 21st and 22nd April 2016. The 
questionnaires were distributed to 75 engineers, supervisors and managers who worked on 
the selected 15 different railway construction sites in Korea near operating railways. 
The author selected the sites to measure the reporting culture of the people who work in 
dangerous environments. They were chosen at random among the roughly 350 railway 
construction sites which held contracts with KR. 
The author explained the overview of the questionnaire survey and asked for participation by 
phone calls. Respondents were chosen randomly at the 15 sites. After 2 days, the author 
closed the survey after confirming there was no intention for additional participation. 
All questionnaires were created, distributed and collected through the Google Docs 
Questionnaire form. The questionnaire is included in Chapter 12 (Appendix). 
7.1.2.4 Survey Analysis 
As the questionnaire survey was simple, Microsoft Excel was employed to analyse the 
completed questionnaires. The results data was exported from Google Docs Questionnaire 
and imported to Microsoft Excel. The results were analysed two ways, i.e., analysis by item 
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Table 11 shows the results of the measurement by item. 
Table 11. Measurement results for reporting culture (The author; n = 62) 
Indicator Question Response 
Negative                           Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 
Learning 
culture 
(Q4) How often do the issues get resolved?   10% 22% 68% 
Leadership (Q5) Are you satisfied with the effectiveness 
of management in dealing with safety 
concern? 
  3% 39% 58% 
(Q6) Do management accept responsibility to 
deal with the safety concern? 
  2% 29% 69% 
Two-way 
communication 
(Q7) Are staff provided with feedback about 
the outcome or progress of the reported 
concerns? 
 3% 7% 21% 69% 
(Q8) Are the issues tracked from the time that 
they are raised through to closure? 
2%  3% 29% 66% 
Attitudes 
towards blame 
(Q9) Are you worried about being punished, if 
you were report to safety concerns? 
19% 11% 10% 18% 42% 
(Q10) Are you willing to report a safety 
concern, if confidentiality can be secured? 
2% 3% 2% 19% 74% 
 
As a result, all items show similar values except Q9, which shows a significant deviation in the 
results compared to the rest of the items. 
According to Q9, about 30% of respondents were very worried (19%) or worried (11%) about 
being punished when they report safety concerns. 
This means that workers have a serious obstacle to reporting safety concerns. Usually, these 
obstacles are associated with under-reporting, so it can be inferred that the risk of under-
reporting is enormous in Korean railway construction sites. 
• Issue: Under-reporting exists in railway construction sites in Korea. 
Fortunately, however, there was a high willingness for workers to report frankly, as shown 
from the answer to Q10. The greatest number of people strongly agreed with the question. If 
a proper reporting channel is prepared, it is certain that people will use it actively. 
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Most people pointed out that blame culture (36%) was the cause of under-reporting. 
In addition, a complicated reporting process (16%), unsecured confidentiality (12%) and 
apathy (12%) also were chosen as main reasons for under-reporting. 
• Issue: Blame culture is the most urgent problem that needs to be solved. 
 
The opinions submitted provided a lot of precious information, related to personal 
inconvenience, institutional absurdities, occupational priorities, etc. besides blame culture. 
For example: 
“Even if I find a risk and request action, the improvement of it must be done by 
myself.” 
“It is urgent to have a concise reporting procedure because the complexity of 
reporting process and documents cause under-reporting.” 
“There is a fear of subsequent activities after reporting.” 
“Due to the tight construction period, general issues are to be resolved by 
themselves.” 
“I am afraid that by reporting internal problems, external assessments are 
discouraging.” 
“I think it’s redundant because it’s possible that internal problems can be solved 
by ourselves.” 
The results of the preliminary survey showed that there is under-reporting in the Korean 
railway industry, as seen in other industries. To overcome this, measurements are urgently 
necessary to improve the blame culture cited as the cause of the under-reporting. 
7.1.3.4 Analysis by Position 
There were no particular differences among the results for reporting culture for safety 
concerns analysed by position, as shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Results of measurement by position (The author) 
Position Total Site manager Supervisor Site engineer Manual 
worker 
Respondents 62 (100%) 16 (25.8%) 9 (14.5%) 36 (58.1%) 1 (1.6%) 
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• Overall results of the survey were very positive, with a mean value 4.440 out of 5.000; 
• The possibility of under-reporting was detected; 
• Blame culture was cited as the reason for under-reporting, and needs to be solved 
urgently. 
As a result, the author identified that the Korean railway industry needs to adopt new 
complementary reporting channels apart from the existing reporting systems to overcome 
under-reporting and blame culture. 
Also, the author captured some practical lessons and issues for developing a KCIRS model: 
• Clearly defined lists of reportable safety issues are necessary; 
• Continuous education of staff should be conducted; 
• Safety awareness of managers is more critical in relation to reporting of accidents and 
safety concerns. 
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7.2 Main Survey 
7.2.1 Purpose 
The main questionnaire survey was conducted to identify the safety culture of the railway 
construction workforce in Korea. Recently, new railway construction, electrification and 
maintenance works which are conducted near operating railways have increased in Korea. 
These types of work are very dangerous because there is not sufficient space to work, and 
installing safety facilities is very difficult and needs a lot of manpower and equipment. 
However, if accidents happen in these areas, it seriously affects operation of the railway. To 
secure the safety of railways, systematic SMSs, sufficient safety facilities and a positive safety 
culture of employees are crucial. 
However, the preliminary questionnaire survey showed that some people were concerned 
about under-reporting. In Chapter 6.1, the author showed that a safety culture assessment 
tool was developed only a few years ago, and has only been applied to a limited number of 
people in the operating companies. Therefore, the author intended to measure safety culture 
in Korea’s railway construction sites, which has not been measured to date. Thus, the author 
wanted to identify the fundamental perception of safety culture of workers in Korean railway 
construction sites. 
Prior to this survey, the author had identified concerns about the inconvenience of existing 
reporting systems and under-reporting of safety events. Therefore, the author included open 
questions about these topics in further research. 
Lastly, this survey was intended to review the necessity for an additional reporting channel to 
complement existing reporting channels. 
7.2.2  Main Questionnaire Survey Methods 
7.2.2.1 Survey Items 
This questionnaire survey included questions on demographics, railway safety culture and 
under-reporting. The questionnaire was based on the ORR’s HMRI Safety Culture Inspection 
Toolkit (HSE, 2005) and other related literature on safety culture. 
The author chose the ORR’s toolkit because it is based on scenarios, so the respondents had 
the advantage of the survey having a familiar approach and using experiences similar to their 
own. 
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The questionnaire consisted of 49 questions and most questions were multiple choice apart 
from one open-ended question about under-reporting. 
The author changed the toolkit’s interview format to a questionnaire format to survey safety 




The first section of the questionnaire survey asked respondents to supply eight demographic 
items. The author intended to use the demographic information in analysing the results. The 
demographic questions were: 
• Gender: male or female; 
• Civil status: married or not married; 
• Age: 20–29, 20–39, 40–49, 50–59, above 60; 
• Education: middle school, high school, university, graduate school; 
• Total experience: less than 1 year, 1–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, more than 20 years; 
• Railway experience: less than 1 year, 1–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, more than 20 years; 
• Position: site manager, supervisor, engineer of contractor, engineer of subcontractor, 
manual worker; 
• Discipline: civil, building, track, electricity, communication, signalling. 
 
Railway Safety Culture 
The section on railway safety culture was designed to measure five main indicators with 40 
questions: leadership, two-way communication, employee involvement, learning culture and 
attitude towards blame (HSE, 2005). 
Table 13 shows the indicators, questions and assessment criteria. 
The 40 questions were based on six scenarios provided by HSE (2005), i.e., safety 
management, safety concern, change management, transfer of information about shift duties, 
time-critical and degraded situations and incident management. 
To do this, the author made a draft of questions from the list of questions in the ORR’s toolkit, 
then sent the draft questionnaire to three experts in Korea’s railway industry for evaluation. 
A five-point Likert scale was employed in this research whereby 1 represented ‘strongly 
disagree’ and 5 represented ‘strongly agree’. 
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The questionnaire survey was aimed at Korean workers; however, as all materials were 
written and reviewed in English, the author translated the questionnaire into Korean. 
Table 13. Railway safety culture questions (adapted from HSE (2005)) 
Indicator Assessment criteria Questions 
Leadership Management visibility 





Internal safety concern reporting system 
Approachable management 
Active response to feedback 





Employee involvement in safety discussions 
Employee participation in the change processes 
5 
Learning culture Safety culture/climate monitoring 
Safety concern investigation and mitigation procedure 




Culture of trust 
Employee awareness of accountabilities 





A Specific Question for Under-Reporting 
The questionnaire survey included an open-ended question related to under-reporting of 
safety concerns. The author added the question to find out the reasons why people hesitate 
to report safety concerns. 
Respondents were allowed to freely write an answer the question. 
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7.2.2.2 Survey Targets 
The author selected 44 railway construction sites. The target sites, adjacent to operating 
railways, were chosen randomly from 379 construction sites that hold contracts with KR. 
For each site selected, the author selected seven or 10 people for the survey according to the 
site magnitude. Finally, 371 people were selected as target staff. 
Table 14 shows the target sites and staff. 
Table 14. Targets of the main questionnaire survey (The author) 




Sites 44 19 3 2 2 3 5 10 
Staff 371 190 21 20 14 21 35 70 
 
7.2.2.3 Survey Administration 
The questionnaire survey was conducted between 3rd and 5th August 2016. 
The 44 target sites were chosen randomly among the 379 construction sites that hold 
contracts with KR. All selected sites were located adjacent to operating railways. 
Respondents were chosen randomly at the selected sites. 
Prior to conducting the questionnaire survey, the author explained the overview of the 
questionnaire survey and asked for participation for each site by phone calls. 
The questionnaires were distributed through the internet to 371 engineers, supervisors and 
managers who worked on the 44 different railway construction sites. 
As all sites were located in Korea, all questionnaires were created, distributed and collected 
through a Google Docs Questionnaire form. The questionnaire is included in Chapter 12 
(Appendix). 
After 2 days, the author closed the survey after confirming the intention for additional 
participations. 
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7.2.2.4 Survey Analysis 
The author adopted IBM SPSS Statistics (v. 24) and Microsoft Excel to calculate the results of 
the questionnaire survey. The results data was exported from Google Docs Questionnaire into 
IBM SPSS Statistics and Microsoft Excel. 
Analysis of the results was conducted in three ways. Firstly, the author analysed the results 
of the survey according to the safety culture indicators. The author extracted the issues and 
lessons through analysing the results on the basis of each assessment criterion of indicators. 
Secondly, the author conducted the analysis according to the characteristics of respondents. 
Using the demographic information included in the survey, the author conducted the analysis 
according to position, experience and discipline. 




The questionnaire survey was conducted between 3rd and 5th August 2016. 
Out of 371 people targeted, 224 people participated in the questionnaire survey, resulting in 
a valid response rate of 60.4%. 
Table 15 shows the demographic information of the respondents. 
The majority of respondents were male (98.7%), and many respondents were married (79.0%). 
The largest group was their 40s (35.7%) followed by those in their 50s (26.8%); 16 people 
above 60 years old participated (7.1%). 
The level of educational attainment among the respondents was quite high. Many of the 
respondents had graduated from university (71.0%). 
Many of the respondents (34.8%) had more than 20 years’ experience in the construction 
industry. However, the amount of railway experience respondents had was less than their 
construction experience. The majority of respondents had railway construction experience of 
only 1 to 5 years (38.8%). This shows that as the railway industry has recently become active, 
the number of new workers involved in the railway industry has increased. 
The position of respondents was evenly distributed, but the proportions of contractors’ 
engineers and manual workers were slightly higher (respectively 26.3%). 
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Many of the respondents were working in the civil discipline (64.7%), and the remainder were 
distributed in the rest of the disciplines. 
Table 15. Demographics of the respondents (The author) 
Gender Male Female 
221 (98.7%) 3 (1.3%) 
Civil 
status 
Married Not married 
177 (79.0%) 47 (21%) 
Education 
 
Middle school High school University Graduate school 
8 (3.6%) 46 (20.5%) 159 (71.0%) 11 (4.9%) 
Age 
(years) 
20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 above 60 
18 (8.0%) 46 (20.5%) 84 (35.7%) 60 (26.8%) 16 (7.1%) 
Position Site 
manager 




































39 (17.4%) 87 (38.8%) 44 (19.6%) 20 (8.9%) 15 (6.7%) 19 (8.5%) 
Discipline Civil Building Track Electricity Communi-
cation 
Signalling 
145 (64.7%) 11 (4.9%) 11 (4.9%) 23 (10.3%) 20 (8.9%) 14 (6.3%) 
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7.2.3.2 Overall Results 
The results of the questionnaire survey were analysed with IBM SPSS Statistics (v. 24) and 
Microsoft Excel. As a result of reliability analysis using IBM SPSS, the Cronbach’s alpha of 
‘attitude towards blame’ was calculated at 0.552, which was below the reliability criteria of 
0.600. Thus, the author excluded Q42 to ensure reliability. The results of re-analysis showed 
that all indicators had values above 0.600 for Cronbach’s alpha, which meant that the 
questionnaire surveyed reliably. Therefore, this analysis of results is based on the 39 
questions. 
Overall, the survey results showed that many respondents responded positively to the survey. 
As shown in Table 16, the mean value of the 39 questions reached 4.413 out of 5.000, a high 
value. This means that people in Korea’s railway construction sites have a very positive safety 
culture. If the score is converted to a percentage, it is very high at 88.2%. The value is much 
higher than that for Korea’s railway safety culture measured by KTSA (81.7% in 2015). 
Table 16. Overall results of the questionnaire survey (The author) 
Indicator Questions Mean S.D. Cronbach’s a 
Leadership 8 4.354* 0.960 0.755 
Two-way communication 9 4.526 0.738 0.835 
Employee involvement 5 4.493 0.675 0.896 
Learning culture 10 4.483 0.770 0.756 
Attitude towards blame 7 4.179* 0.987 0.666 
Total 39 4.413 0.846  
n = 224; * below the overall mean value 
 
However, there were many differences among the result values for the five safety culture 
indicators. 
Most respondents had positively rated ‘two-way communication’ (mean = 4.526, S.D. = 0.738), 
‘employee involvement’ (mean = 4.493, S.D. = 0.675) and ‘learning culture’ (mean = 4.483, 
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7.2.3.3 Analysis by Indicators of Safety Culture 
 
Leadership 
‘Leadership’ is the indicator for measurement of management attitude towards safety. It 
measures whether management have the belief that safety is always the best value and takes 
precedence over performance (HSE, 2005). 
Table 17 shows the results for leadership. 
Table 17. Results for leadership (The author) 
Assessment criteria Questions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Management visibility 5 4.601** 0.604 
Performance vs. safety management priority 2 3.685* 1.396 
Safety priorities behaviour 1 4.455 0.675 
Leadership 8 4.354 0.960 
n = 224; * lowest value; ** highest value 
 
The mean value for leadership was 4.354, lower than the overall mean value of 4.413. Among 
the three assessment criteria for leadership, ‘performance vs. safety management priority’ 
had the lowest mean value of 3.685, the lowest value among all assessment criteria. 
This shows that managers do not have the belief that they consider safety as a paramount. 
Normally, they have tended to prioritise schedule or cost rather than safety in railway 
construction sites. 
HSE (2005) recommended that management should repeatedly make sure employees 
consider safety as the first priority in order to improve the indicator of leadership. 
The indicator directly influences the formation of a positive safety culture in employees; 
therefore, it is very important and needs to be improved as soon as possible. 
• Issue: Management must make sure to put top priority on safety. 
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‘Two-way communication’ is the indicator of whether organisations have channels through 
which all employees can be involved in safety-related matters, and whether the flow of 
information is successful in both directions. 
Table 18 shows the results for two-way communication. 
Table 18. Results for two-way communication (The author) 
Assessment criteria Questions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Active response to feedback 1 4.388* 0.731 
Approachable management 2 4.632 0.599 
Feedback systems 1 4.395 0.975 
Internal safety concern reporting system 2 4.681** 0.582 
Safety information communication system 2 4.464 0.688 
Two-way communication 8 4.526 0.738 
n = 224; * lowest value; ** highest value 
 
As a result, the mean value for two-way communication was 4.526, higher than the overall 
mean value of 4.413. The indicator had the highest value among the five safety culture 
indicators. 
However, there was something noticeable about the detailed assessment criteria. The two 
assessment criteria related to feedback had lower values than the overall mean value. If 
feedback activities are not sufficient, employees are disappointed and become less active in 
reporting safety concerns. The criteria affect the reporting rates of accidents and safety 
concerns. 
To improve these factors, it is necessary to establish specific feedback channels and check 
them periodically. 
• Issue: Feedback channels must be strengthened. 
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This assessment criterion measures whether all employees in the organisation can participate 
in the process of making important decisions, and whether actual participation and feedback 
are successful. 
Table 19 shows the results for employee involvement. 
Table 19. Results for employee involvement (The author) 
Assessment criteria Questions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Employee involvement in safety discussions 1 4.357* 0.768 
Employee participation in change processes 4 4.527** 0.646 
Employment involvement 5 4.493 0.675 
n = 224; * lowest value; ** highest value 
 
The mean value was 4.493, higher than the overall mean value of 4.413, and the standard 
deviation was 0.675. 
Between the two assessment criteria, the value for ‘employee involvement in safety 
discussions’ was below average. This indicates that although safety activities should be 
conducted by all constituents, they are just led by some managers. 
As shown in the results of interviews, in Korea, normal workers do not want to participate in 
safety activities, and they tend to be very negative. Many workers are not involved in safety 
activities, other than requiring safety gear for themselves. 
To improve this, more opportunities should be created for employees to engage in safety 
activities. 
• Issue: Safety discussions must be facilitated to engage more people. 
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This indicator is related to activities from which lessons are learned about safety concerns 
and which prevent future accidents through the lessons, e.g., finding problems, establishing 
measures and monitoring the process. The indicator measures whether the learning activities 
are conducted well in the whole hierarchical structure of organisations. 
The results for learning culture are shown in Table 20. 
Table 20. Results for the learning culture (The author) 
Assessment criteria Questions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Incident investigation system 6 4.479 0.811 
Safety concern investigation and mitigation 
procedure 
2 4.529** 0.648 
Safety concern log 1 4.496 0.689 
Safety culture/climate monitoring 1 4.406* 0.815 
Learning culture 10 4.483 0.770 
n = 224; * lowest value; ** highest value 
 
The mean value for learning culture was 4.483, somewhat higher than the overall mean value 
of 4.413. Both assessment criteria had good values, but that for ‘safety culture/climate 
monitoring’ was slightly lower than the overall mean value. 
Actually, in Korea, periodic measurements of safety culture were not conducted, and not a 
lot of people were aware of safety culture. 
Although the values for learning culture were slightly higher than the overall mean value, 
further improvement is necessary. 
Periodic measurement of safety culture is one of the critical processes for identifying the 
vulnerability of safety systems and to achieve continuous improvement of safety. 
Therefore, measurements of safety culture should be conducted on a regular basis. 
• Issue: Measurements of safety culture are not conducted regularly.  
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Attitude Towards Blame 
It is important to recognise that the ultimate responsibility for accidents is held by the 
organisation. This indicator measures how well employees understand that investigations of 
accidents or incidents are for learning lessons not for punishment. 
The results for attitude towards blame are shown in Table 21. 
Table 21. Results for attitude towards blame (The author) 
Assessment criteria Questions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Culture of trust 1 4.531** 0.676 
Disciplinary process 2 4.150 1.086 
Employee awareness of accountabilities 1 4.509 0.621 
Fault allocation process 2 3.710* 1.085 
Safety accountability 1 4.491 0.715 
Attitude towards blame 7 4.179 0.987 
n = 224; * lowest value; ** highest value 
 
The mean value for attitude towards blame was 4.179, quite a lot lower than the overall mean 
value. Among the five assessment criteria, ‘disciplinary process’ and ‘fault allocation process’ 
had very low values which were much lower than the overall mean value. 
In particular, the value for ‘fault allocation process’ was 3.710, the second lowest value among 
the 20 assessment criteria. 
Normally, people are extremely worried about being punished for causing accidents on sites. 
The root causes of accidents should be sought at the organisational level. If it is sought at the 
individual level, safety culture could be seriously affected. 
Therefore, it is important to construct an appropriate and just culture in organisations. 
• Issue: Blaming individuals hinders communication and causes a delay in reporting of 
safety events. 
  
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 







7.2.3.4 Analysis by Characteristics of Respondents 
This questionnaire survey contained eight demographic questions. The information obtained 
was analysed by position and experience. 
Analysis by Position 
This analysis was conducted to identify the various safety subculture in hierarchical 
organisations. There were five types of position, and the results are shown in Table 22. 
Table 22. Analysis of safety culture by position (The author) 
Position Questions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Manual workers 59 4.323* 0.877 
Subcontractors’ site engineers 24 4.402 0.794 
Contractors’ site engineers 59 4.448 0.832 
Supervisors 29 4.420 0.831 
Site managers 53 4.477** 0.850 
Total 224 4.413 0.846 
n = 224; * lowest value; ** highest value 
 
The mean value for manual workers was 4.323, quite a low value. The rest of the job positions 
showed similar values for safety culture. 
Clearly, there were gaps between managers and manual workers in terms of safety culture. 
Cooper (2000) and Harvey et al. (2002) mentioned subculture caused by functional groups, 
hierarchical levels, organisational roles, etc. 
Although the differences between positions were not significant, it is clear that manual 
workers had a more negative safety culture than managers. 
In order to overcome the gaps between different positions for safety culture, and to construct 
a positive safety culture, strengthening relationship between staff and management, 
improving level of trust within the hierarchy and promoting greater employee ownership in 
safety issues are necessary (Clarke, 1998). 
Above all, there is a need to improve communication between positions. 
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7.2.4 Findings from the Main Questionnaire Survey 
The main questionnaire survey was conducted to measure the safety culture in Korea’s 
railway industry. 
The survey consisted of 49 questions categorised into three parts, demographics, safety 
culture and under-reporting. 
From the 44 railway construction sites near operating railways, 224 people participated in the 
survey. The results of the survey are shown below: 
• Overall results were very positive, with a mean value of 4.413 out of 5.000; 
• ‘Leadership’ and ‘attitude towards blame’ were identified as deficiencies; 
• There was a gap in safety culture between managers and manual workers; 
• Fear of being punished negatively affected reporting of safety events. 
The analysis shows that, although Korea’s railway construction sites had good results for the 
safety culture survey, more improvement is necessary because there was a clear concern 
about under-reporting. Also, the author identified some practical lessons and issues: 
• Management must ensure safety is a top priority; 
• Feedback channels should be strengthened; 
• Safety discussions must be facilitated to engage more people; 
• Safety culture must be measured regularly; 
• Blaming individuals hinders communication and causes a delay in reporting of safety 
events; 
• A safety culture education program is necessary for less experienced people. 
 
7.3 Issues for Model Development 
The questionnaire surveys were conducted to identify the real perception of safety culture on 
Korean railway construction sites. The survey was conducted in two phases. 
For the preliminary survey, the results showed that Korean railway construction workers have 
a very positive safety culture, with a mean value of 4.440 out of 5.000. However, the author 
identified the possibility of under-reporting caused by blame culture. 
For the main survey, the results again showed that Korean railway construction workers have 
a very positive safety culture, with 4.413 out of 5.000. But the author detected a gap in safety 
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culture between managers and manual workers. Also, many workers suffered from fear of 
being punished, which had a negatively effect on reporting of safety events. 
Through the questionnaire surveys, the author identified some practical lessons and issues 
for developing a CIRS model: 
• Clearly defined lists of reportable safety issues are necessary; 
• Feedback channels must be strengthened; 
• A safety culture education programme is necessary; 
• Safety culture must be measured regularly; 
• Safety discussions must be facilitated to engage more people. 
  
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 








Prior to establishing the CIRS model, interviews were conducted in order to create a more 
efficient CIRS model by supplementing the research findings from literature reviews, case 
studies and questionnaire surveys. The interviews were conducted in two categories: people 
working on railway construction sites in Korea and people working at CIRAS in the UK. 
8.1 People in Korea’s Railway Industry 
8.1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this sort of interview was to evaluate the safety culture and to identify safety 
issues in Korea’s railway industry. Although the author conducted a quantitative evaluation 
of safety culture from on-site supervisors to manual workers through other questionnaire 
surveys, the practical purpose of this sort of interview was to conduct an exhaustive 
assessment to identify underlying issues not identified in the questionnaire surveys. This 
interview was not intended to measure the level of safety culture of Korea’s railway industry, 
but intended to find out the real issues related to safety culture on each site. 
8.1.2 Design of Interviews 
8.1.2.1 Methods 
The Korean railway industry, to date, has not produced a tool that can be used for interviews 
to measure the safety culture; this interview was based on the HSE Safety Culture Toolkit. The 
toolkit, a safety culture measurement tool using interviews, was developed to measure the 
safety culture in the British railway industry by ORR (HSE, 2005). There are many ways to 
measure safety culture, and many of them use the method of interviewing. However, the 
author conducted these interviews with the ORR’s tools to facilitate comparison with the 
results of the questionnaire survey and ensure consistency with the results of the 
questionnaire surveys. 
The interviews created for this research were based on the ORR assessment tool and consist 
of five indicators that make up safety culture, i.e., leadership, two-way communication, 
employee involvement, learning culture and attitude towards blame (HSE, 2005). 
The author created a standardised set of questions for interviews to maintain consistency 
throughout all interviews. 
The interviews were conducted by telephone with staff working on Korean railway 
construction sites. All interviews were conducted in Korean. The results of the interview were 
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written up and confirmed by the interviewee. The results approved by the interviewee were 
translated into English and then utilised in this thesis. 
In this process, all records related to interviewees were kept anonymously, ensuring that the 
identity of all interviewees was kept confidential. 
8.1.2.2 Selection of Interviewees 
The railway construction sites were selected following the step to represent typical railway 
construction sites in Korea. 
The author selected a conventional railway project and an early-phase project to identify 
recent trends in safety culture. 
After selecting one project to identify realistic safety culture, finally three of the seven sites 
included in the project were chosen randomly. The sites selected are shown in Table 24. 
Table 24. Sites selected for interviews (The author) 
Site A Site B 
• Area: civil works 
• Contract price: £52 million 
• Progress: 0.48% 
• Length of railway: 11.90 km 
• Structures: 5 bridges, 4 tunnels and 2 stations 
• Area: civil works 
• Contract price: £115 million  
• Progress: 19.9% 
• Length of railway: 8.12 km 
• Structures: 2 tunnels and 1 bridge 
Site C Project 1 
• Area: civil works 
• Contract price: £78 million  
• Progress: 0.6% 
• Length of railway: 12.79 km 
• Structures: 2 tunnels, 1 station and 5 bridges 
• Sites A, B and C are included in Project 1. 
 
Interviews were conducted for each of the three selected sites. For each site, three people, 
i.e., site manager, supervisor and safety manager, were interviewed, and the project manager 
of the owners was also interviewed. 
Finally, to understand the safety culture throughout the project, 10 people were selected, 
including the project manager of the overall project. 
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Interviews were conducted during the period of 5th to 7th July 2017 and interview results were 
finalised by being reviewed by interviewees between 17th and 21st July 2017. 
8.1.2.3 Development of the Question Set 
The development of the interview question set for this research was based on the questions 
presented in ORR’s safety culture toolkit (HSE, 2005). The questions are designed to measure 
five safety culture indicators, i.e., leadership, two-way communication, employee 
involvement, learning culture and attitude towards blame. These indicators are assessed 
through 22 different assessment criteria. The author prepared a question list that represents 
the corresponding criteria, as shown in Table 25. 
These selected questions were used as a standard question set for consistent interviews and 
were applied equally to all interviewees. 
Table 25. Question set for interviews (adapted from HSE (2005)) 
Indicator Assessment criteria Questions 
Leadership Management visibility Is the safety management system established? 
Do the managers have an interest in this? Are the managers 
performing a good safety inspection? 
 Safety-prioritised behaviour Do you think safety is paramount even if you have a serious 
situation such as being behind schedule or poor quality? Is it 
possible for employees to report without regard to cost of 
safety? 
 Performance vs. safety 
management priority 
Do managers have clear views that safety is paramount? Are 
there sufficient costs associated with safety? 
Two-way 
communication 
Internal safety concern 
reporting system 
Is there a framework for reporting safety concerns? 
Does it work well? Any confusion during operation? 
 Approachable management Do you have a chance to meet the manager regarding safety 
concern reporting? 
Do the managers ask the staff if there are any safety concerns? 
 Active response to feedback Is there a good communication system with regard to changes 
and employees receiving feedback quickly? 
 Safety information 
communication system 
Is safety-related information communicated well at the start of 
the shift or whenever there is a handover of duties? 
Do you think these processes are effective? 
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Indicator Assessment criteria Questions 
Two-way 
communication 
Comprehension of safety 
information 
Are employees actively accessing or requesting safety 
information? Do employees or employers have all the safety 
information needed to work? 




Employee involvement in 
safety discussions 
Is there a way for employees to participate in safety 
management? (staff excluding Safety Manager) 
 Employee participation in the 
change processes 
Does your company have procedures for managing changes? 
Do you have a system to communicate with others when 
changes occur? 
 Employee training about the 
change 
Is your company aware of the need for training when changes 
occur? And is your company doing training accordingly? 
 Employee motivation Are employees reporting voluntarily in the process of change? 
Are you positive about change? 
Learning culture Safety culture/climate 
monitoring 
Does your company measure safety culture periodically? 
 Safety concern investigation 
and mitigation procedure 
Are reported items fully investigated? 
 Safety concerns log Is safety concern spread to employees? 
Is a similar concern processed well if similar concerns occur? 
 Incident investigation system Is there a thorough investigation and implementation of the 
measures for root causes of accidents? 
Attitude towards 
blame 
Culture of trust Are safety concerns constantly reported and addressed? 
Does the manager handle safety concerns when safety concerns 
are identified? 
 Employee awareness of 
accountabilities 
Are all employees aware of safety responsibilities? 
Is this checked periodically? 
 Safety accountability Do managers take charge of safety first and take responsibility 
according to their results? Are all staff and manual workers fully 
aware of their responsibilities and obligations in emergency 
situations? 
 Fault allocation process Why do you investigate for accidents? To prevent future 
accidents or punishment of those involved? 
Is there any punishment or blame on the person involved prior 
to identifying the root cause? 
 Disciplinary process Is the process clearly divided according to the degree of error? 
Does the degree of disposal change every time? 
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Each of these questions was applied in the interviews to address the six activities and issues. 
Interviewees were presented with scenarios that are common in the field to help them 
understand. 
The categories of scenarios which were used in the interviews are (HSE, 2005): 
• Safety management; 
• Safety concerns; 
• Change management; 
• Transfer of information about shift duties; 
• Time-critical and degraded situations; 
• Incident management. 
These scenarios are aligned with ORR’s scenarios in the safety culture toolkit. However, the 
author presented specific examples to the interviewees, citing situations that are specific to 
railway construction sites in Korea. The Scenarios is included in Chapter 12 (Appendix). 
 
8.1.2.4 Data Analysis 
All of the results of the interviews were written according to the scenario. However, personal 
information was not recorded at all to secure confidentiality of the interviewees. Therefore, 
data was collected and analysed, excluding personal information, i.e., age, education, 
experience, etc. The results of the scenario-based interviews were organised in line with 
safety indicators for analysis purposes; an assessment of safety culture was conducted and 
analysed according to the definition of the 22 assessment criteria. The analysis results were 
grouped by safety culture indicator. 
In addition, analysis of the safety culture by job role was conducted, and the results of the 
questionnaire surveys and the interviews compared. Further analysis of interview results is 
presented in Chapter 8.1.3. 
8.1.3 Results 
The interview results were analysed according to the indicators of safety culture and position 
of interviewee. The safety culture of Korean railway construction sites was generally found to 
be positive, but some deficiencies were found. 
The intention was to analyse the interview results based on the problems mentioned. 
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8.1.3.1 Analysis by Indicator 
 
Safety Leadership 
All interviewees said that managers were implementing various initiatives to promote safety 
level, and managers were clearly aware of their role and responsibility for safety. It was 
certain that managers had a positive safety culture overall. 
• All site managers clearly knew that they were the responsible person for safety 
management on the sites and had a sense of responsibility; 
• All site managers conducted safety tours within sites twice every day and ordered 
remedy of deficiencies; 
• It can be positively evaluated that most field staff stated that safety is a top priority. 
However, the project manager felt that cost had a higher priority than safety on the 
sites. This is because project manager takes a more critical position on safety than site 
managers; 
• A positive note was found in that managers are often encouraged to implement costly 
safety measures, e.g., additional safety facilities; 
• The project manager for the whole project was more critical on safety issues, thinking 
that site managers place significant emphasis on project cost rather than safety. 
 
Two-Way Communication 
Slightly vulnerable areas were found relating to the indicator of two-way communication. In 
particular, many interviewees had difficulty in reporting safety concerns and communicating 
safety information with managers or other people. 
• Most safety information was delivered in the course of safety training, i.e., one-way 
communication, and some people felt inadequate to build a framework for two-way 
communication; 
• Most managers were asking for active reporting of safety-related information by 
frontline workers, but there were not many reports from frontline workers; 
•  Some procedures for ensuring that the necessary safety information has been 
communicated were unsystematic; 
• In some cases, e.g., shift duties, communication of safety information is not structured 
well and it was sometimes impossible to confirm whether it had been delivered or not 
because it was only verbally communicated; 
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• There were some procedures for reporting safety concerns, but there were few safety 
concerns reported. 
There was a higher chance of preventing future accidents through investigation of safety 
concerns. In order not to miss such good opportunities, efficient reporting systems are 
necessary to conduct proactive excavation, reporting and investigation of safety concerns. 
• Issue: Insufficient systems to report safety concerns. 
Sometimes, information exchange procedures for safety were unclear even when accurate 
information was needed, and the verification procedure sometimes failed. 
• Issue: Unsystematic procedures for delivering and verification of safety information. 
 
Employee Involvement 
Effective involvement of employees is crucial, since safety-related information should be 
communicated appropriately to managers who need to make appropriate decisions at the 
time of need. 
• Most employees had a lot of interest in safety, and managers encourage active 
participation by employees; 
• There was a lack of sufficient workers’ voluntary participation on various sites; 
• Workers took corrective actions against points but they were not actively involved in 
other matters except those directly related to the safety of the individual, e.g., safety 
gear. Site managers expressed concern about this; 
• Even though safety information was systematically managed by contractors and 
subcontractors, it was not clear that the system delivers safety information to field 
workers. 
Even though employee involvement is crucial in safety systems, there was lack of voluntary 
participation of frontline staff on many sites. 
• Issue: Lack of voluntary participation by workers. 
 
Existence of a Learning Organisation 
Each site conducted various safety education programmes in accordance with relevant 
legislation and rules, and a lot of safety relevant information was delivered to staff through 
the programme well. When a safety event was reported, the investigation identified the root 
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cause and the results were widely shared to prevent future accidents. However, a problem 
was found in that some safety concerns were not reported. 
• At many sites, the concept of safety culture was not yet established and measurement 
of safety culture was not conducted at most sites; 
• Safety-related information was communicated through meetings and documents etc.; 
however, most safety information was communicated to workers through a safety 
education programme; 
• Although most sites had a system for learning lessons through investigation of safety 
concerns, the safety concerns were not often reported so the opportunity for learning 
was limited; 
• Although the system for investigating accidents was well-equipped, it is necessary to 
better understand and utilise experience and knowledge acquired through 
investigations. 
It was identified that measurement of safety culture had not been conducted. As 
measurement of safety culture helps to obtain a more comprehensive understanding for 
safety culture, periodic measurements of safety culture are advisable. However, even the 
managers had seen very low levels of awareness about the need for measurement of safety 
culture. 
• Issue: Lack of awareness and measuring of safety culture. 
 
Attitude Towards Blame 
As a blame culture prevents workers from reporting safety events, and thus hinders learning 
from past safety events and has a negative impact on safety culture, the management of 
blame culture is very important. Some workers were very afraid of the punishment involved 
in safety events. Because of this, it was understood that safety concerns were not reported 
properly. 
• Managers and workers were clearly cognisant of their responsibility for safety; 
• The investigation of and problem-solving system for safety concerns was sometimes 
unclear, and reporting of safety concerns was not properly implemented. In many cases, 
these safety concerns were considered to be part of the daily routine and the fear of 
being punished related to safety concerns prevented people from reporting them; 
• Most workers had a positive perception that the purpose of accident investigation is 
not to punish but to identify the root cause; 
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• Most of the criteria for personal punishment by accident were clearly established but 
the measure was so strong that many workers tended to be very fearful. These fears 
could lead to under-reporting of accidents, thus quick resolution is needed. 
Most staff were well aware of the procedures and reporting targets. However, there was 
ample probability that the fear of severe punishment involved with an accident would lead to 
under-reporting of accidents. 
• Issue: Fear of severe punishments for individuals involved in accidents. 
 
8.1.3.2 Analysis by Job Role 
The interviews were conducted for four positions, i.e., supervisor, site manager, safety 
manager and project manager. They were all aware of the importance of safety and possessed 
adequate knowledge of the SMS and operation. Regarding measurement of safety culture 
and reporting of safety concerns, every interviewee felt that improvements were needed. 
Analysis of results is shown below. 
 
Supervisors 
Generally, the supervisors had positive attitudes to and extensive knowledge of the SMS. 
The results are similar to the results of the questionnaire surveys, in that supervisors have the 
most positive position on safety. However, the author found the following insufficient aspects: 
• The supervisors were not familiar with the concept of safety culture and measurement 
of safety culture; 
• Many supervisors worried that safety concerns were not reported properly. 
 
Site Managers 
Overall, the site managers had a relatively positive safety culture and had extensive safety 
knowledge, but they were relatively critical in comparison to other site positions. They were 
believed to be performing well in the organisation and in operation of overall SMS. However, 
as a legal liability for safety, they need improvement as follows: 
• Some sites lack awareness of the concept and measurement of safety culture; 
• Believed that safety work was being carried out only by some staff, so demanded that 
all staff should work responsibly on safety works; 
• Believed that active reporting was necessary for safety concerns, but did not think it 
was well operated. 
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As practical people managing safety affairs, they had a positive safety culture overall. 
However, they provided the following points that required systematic supplementation: 
• More safety facilities for workers are needed. If necessary, safety facilities should be 
installed even if at a higher level than the legal standard, based on on-site judgment; 
• Improvements are required in practical areas, including simplified safety-related 
documents; 
• As with other positions, there was a relatively low perception of safety culture. 
 
Project Manager 
The project manager had a more critical stance on the safety culture of the sites. The person 
wanted to extend site safety information to the project manager and hoped that workers at 
the sites would change more actively with regard to safety works. Although safety systems 
had improved more than ever before, the project manager thought that there was plenty 
more room for advancement. 
• The project manager was not familiar with the concept and measurement of safety 
culture; 
• The project manager believed that more than 30% of safety concerns had not been 
reported, and that important safety concerns must be reported to project managers; 
• The manager felt that the safety consciousness of individuals in the sites was still 
insufficient and further improvement was needed; 
• The manager believed that communication of safety information at the sites was 
somewhat perfunctory, and in particular was asking for more active sharing of safety 
information at the sites; 
• The manager believed there was a problem with the safety consciousness of 
subcontractors. 
 
8.1.4 Findings from Interviews in Korea 
The purpose of this sort of interview was to evaluate the safety culture and to identify safety 
issues in Korea’s railway industry. 
As a result of the interviews, it was found that there is a fairly positive safety culture on Korean 
railway construction sites. People in every position were clearly aware of the importance of 
safety, and the safety system was generally well constructed. Some sites had also 
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implemented highly efficient safety management initiatives. However, a lack of awareness of 
the concept and measurement of safety culture was found at all sites. Furthermore, 
improvement in the lack of reporting safety concerns was recognised as an urgent task. 
The indicators of ‘attitude towards blame’ and ‘existence of learning organisation’ were 
relatively underrated, and ‘leadership’ was rated higher than other indicators. 
The site managers had a very positive safety culture; on the other hand, the project manager 
evaluated on-site safety from a more critical position. 
Through the interviews, the author identified some lessons and issues for developing a CIRS 
model: 
• Insufficient system to report safety concerns; 
• Unsystematic procedures for delivering safety information; 
• Lack of voluntary participation by workers; 
• Lack of awareness and measurement of safety culture; 
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The interviews were conducted with the intelligence manager, communication manager and 
a report analyst who had knowledge of the concept and operation of CIRSs. 
8.2.2.3 Questions Used in the Interviews 
As the purpose of the interviews was to understand the status of CIRAS, the questions 
comprised general information relating to this. 
The list of questions was sent in advance and some replies were given in advance. On the day 
of the interview, the interviewees explained the status and functionality of CIRAS based on 
the pre-provided question list. After the explanation, some additional questions followed. 
The main content of the questions was: 
• General information on CIRAS; 
• Annual performance and results; 
• Annual budget and funding methods; 
• Work process for processing reports; 
• Strategy to secure confidentiality; 
• Current challengers to CIRAS. 
8.2.3 Results 
The staff at CIRAS had great pride in their success, and they considered secure confidentiality 
for reporters as the primary factor for success. Based on this success, more than 1,000 
companies participate in the CIRAS scheme, exceeding the scope of railway territory. 
Nevertheless, the number of operating staff in CIRAS remains relatively small compared to 
the number of participating companies. 
All interviewees highlighted securing confidentiality, and the work process of CIRAS was 
focused on the guarantee of confidentiality. 
The main results of the interviews were as follows: 
• Confidentiality is CIRAS’s most important asset, and is crucial for system to function; 
• Independence is very important to ensure confidentiality; even though CIRAS is within 
RSSB, it is independently operated; 
• To guarantee confidentiality of reporters, their information is known only by two people 
in CIRAS; 
• External assumptions or questions related to reporters should be sternly blocked; 
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• All data related to individuals is completely removed within 6 months, eliminating the 
risk of hacking; 
• When distributing the report of safety concerns to related companies, if the content of 
the report is too general, companies have difficulty in solving the issue, and thus CIRAS 
strives to provide ‘balanced information’ within the limits of securing confidentiality; 
• CIRAS is operated independently using fees from the participating companies which are 
arranged according to the size of the company; 
• CIRAS consists of staff with experience in a variety of areas, including media, 
communications, physiology, etc.; 
• When first becoming aware of CIRAS, people are curious about why an additional 
system is needed. However, 75% of the issues addressed in CIRAS had not been resolved 
by internal reporting systems. CIRAS is a good system to complement existing reporting 
channels; 
• 95% of CIRAS reporting is submitted by frontline staff; 
• When receiving an internal report on received issues, a separate confirmation check is 
conducted. 
8.2.4 Findings from Interviews in the UK 
The purpose of the interviews was to understand the concept of CIRSs, and the operational 
status and process of CIRAS. 
As a result of the interviews, it was identified that confidentiality is of paramount value for 
CIRAS, and every work process is designed and conducted to secure confidentiality. 
From the interviews, the author identified some lessons and issues for developing a CIRS 
model: 
• Confidentiality is CIRAS’s most important asset; 
• The independence of CIRAS is very important to ensure confidentiality; 
• Various measures are adopted in work processes to ensure confidentiality; 
• CIRAS is a complementary reporting channel that collaborates with existing reporting 
channels. 
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8.3 Issues for Model Development 
Interviews were conducted to evaluate the safety culture of the Korean railway industry, and 
to identify the status and success factors of CIRAS. 
From the interviews, the author found out the real issues related to safety culture on railway 
construction sites, and captured precious operational properties of CIRAS. 
Key issues and lessons learned during the interviews to be used in developing the CIRS model 
are: 
Safety Culture of the Korean Railway Industry 
• The Korean railway industry has a systematic SMS, but lacks the systems and perception 
for handling safety concerns; 
• Frontline staff lack willingness to voluntarily participate in reporting of safety concerns; 
• Cognition and utilisation of safety culture is insufficient; 
• Many people are exceptionally anxious of the punishment caused by accidents. 
Operation of CIRAS 
• Ensuring confidence of confidentiality is paramount in CIRAS; 
• Minimising contact with the reported issues of safety concerns is necessary; 
• Personal data must be checked completely so it is not included in reports, and for 
completed issues it must be erased as soon as possible; 
• As most reports on safety concerns are submitted by frontline staff, defining the scope 
of reporters is important; 
• CIRAS is suitable for operating in a complementary manner rather than a competitive 
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Through this framework, the author intended to connect the findings of this research and a 
new CIRS model organically. 
The framework for developing a CIRS model consists of the following: 
• Literature Review 
The literature reviews were conducted on three main themes, safety culture, reporting 
system and Korean railway industry, to obtain the basic information needed to establish 
a CIRS model. The literature reviews were conducted continuously throughout the 
research, and the findings were reflected in the establishment of a CIRS model; 
 
• Case Study 
The case study method was used to obtain basic data needed to establish a CIRS model 
through practical cases. CIRSs have been used in various fields, such as aviation, 
healthcare and nuclear power plants, and have already been adopted in the railway 
industry, e.g., in the UK, US and Canada. The author selected two examples of best 
practice for CIRSs from railway industries operating successful CIRSs. Thus, CIRAS in the 
UK and C3RS in the US were chosen. Currently, the institutions are operating the CIRSs 
very successfully.  
As the operational scales or systems were very different, the introduction process and 
application targets were also very different. These reflected the reality of each railway 
industry which made it a good comparison.  
In addition, the author selected Korea’s railway safety culture as a case study. Through 
this, the author identified the actual safety culture and reporting culture of Korea’s 
railway industry, which helped establish a CIRS model for Korea’s railway industry; 
 
• Questionnaire Surveys 
Questionnaire surveys were conducted on Korea’s railway industry in two stages. The 
surveys used quantitative methods and the accuracy of the survey results was 
reinforced by collecting answers from a wide variety of people.  
Based on the surveys, the author verified that a new reporting channel is required in 
addition to the existing reporting channels in Korea, and identified the strengths and 
weaknesses of safety culture which were applied to the KCIRS model; 
 
• Interviews 
Two types of interview were conducted. The first was conducted with staff on Korean 
railway construction sites. This was to examine the safety culture of the Korean railway 
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industry in a qualitative manner. The second was conducted with CIRAS staff in the UK. 
This was to identify the success factors of CIRAS; 
 
• Analysis and Synthesis 
The author analysed all the research results and synthesised the lessons and issues. 













&E%,+/2&)+G! 1/,+/%82%1! /&! 0%GE! 13HH%1173G! &E%,+/2&)! &7! /0%! '&4%GP! %Q8QP! +)! %43H+/2&)! +)4!














;0%! 2)7,+1/,3H/3,%!'&43G%!'&1/G#! 4%+G1! O2/0! M=Q! ;>F1! 7&,'! /0%! ;>F!'&43G%P! +)4!'%/,&!
H&'E+)2%1!"%G&)8!/&!/0%!'%/,&!'&43G%P!%/HQ!:2'2G+,G#P!%+H0!H&'E+)#!7&,'1!+!'&43G%!O2/0!
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 
Korea's Railway Safety Culture 
Beomjoon Park 





companies with similar characteristics. This modular structure has the advantages of being 
able to attempt gradual adoption of the model and being used as a standard model in other 
industries. 
There are four distinct elements that make up the model, i.e., KCIRS Office (KCO), Module 
Support Team (MST), Company Support Team (CST) and reporter. To configure the KCIRS 
model, each element was defined as having unique roles and responsibilities which are 
presented in detail in the next section. 
9.2.2 Roles and Responsibilities 
All roles and responsibilities within KCIRS must be defined in the ‘System Operating 
Procedures’, and the procedures should be carefully prepared in accordance with operational 
conditions. The procedures must be created in advance, before the start of operation of the 
KCIRS, and must be announced publicly. In this regard, the author defined the standard roles 
and responsibilities related to the KCIRS model as outlined below: 
 
KCIRS Office (KCO) 
KCO may be created by the government or the industry. 
• KCO is the core organisation that operates KCIRS, and operating KCIRS is the primary 
role of KCO. The basic function of operation is managing safety concerns, i.e., collecting 
reports of safety concerns, and passing the reports to the appropriate MST. The KCO 
manages accumulated data; 
• There are two additional roles besides the operation of KCIRS, i.e., the roles of 
evaluation and education; 
- KCO should measure the impact on KCIRS of safety and safety culture, and should 
develop a continuous development process by identifying strengths and 
weaknesses through the evaluation process; 
- KCO is required to be responsible for education, which is related to sustainability of 
KCIRS. KCO must disseminate the safety-related knowledge accumulated by 
operation of KCIRS, and should establish the proper concept of KCIRS and ensure 
that the system continues to operate in the future; 
• In general, an independent organisation is required to perform the KCO role. However, 
the roles of KCO can be changed in case of coordination with MST according to the 
circumstances. In such cases, the characteristics of KCO should be decided according to 
the roles; 
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• Confidentiality ought to be everywhere. All work processes must be designed and 
implemented on the basis of securing confidentiality. 
KCO works with other organisational units to achieve its objectives, i.e., MSTs and CSTs. 
 
Module Support Teams (MSTs) 
MSTs are organisational units that should be established in each module to monitor and to 
control the actual operation of each module of KCIRS. They are responsible for carrying out 
the following functions: 
• When reports of safety concerns are submitted through KCO, MSTs perform a role in 
reviewing them and assisting the relevant company to make a proper decision; 
• MSTs are responsible for the evaluation and education of the entities within the module. 
However, MSTs should divide the roles to avoid overlap with the education and 
evaluation roles of KCO. 
Although MSTs may be formed as independent organisations within the module, it is 
permitted for leading companies to take the role. 
 
Company Support Teams (CSTs) 
CSTs are organisational units for practical implementation of KCIRS, organised by each 
company. In comparison with C3RS, CSTs are responsible for both the roles of PRTs and 
Support Teams. They are tasked with the following activities: 
• CSTs execute the role of practical problem-solving, i.e., reviews reports, plan and select 
corrective actions, implement the actions; 
• CSTs need to select experts in each discipline. 
 
Reporters 
As stated in chapter 1.1, reporters are the people who report safety issues. They are 
responsible for doing the following: 
• The reporter plays a role in discovering and reporting safety concerns; 
• Basically, all employees must be able to act as reporters. 
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9.2.3 Scope for Reporting 
The scope of reporting is important in the operation of CIRSs. Too wide a scope for reporting 
can produce difficulties in the operation of CIRSs, and too limited a scope can reduce the 
number of reports, thereby making CIRSs obsolete. 
If the scope of reporting is not clear, the reporter may be confused, resulting in inconsistent 
reporting. Vincent et al. (1999) recommend having a clearly defined list of reportable 
incidents for successful incident reporting. 
However, a new approach to safety has recently become popular. The approach is not only 
interested in accidents and incidents, i.e., focusing on Safety-I, but also in everyday actions 
and outcomes, i.e., focusing on Safety-II. Indeed, we can find risks as well as opportunities in 
everyday actions and outcomes (Hollnagel, 2014). 
In this respect, the author suggests that the scope of reporting must be defined as broadly as 
possible to obtain sufficient cases for the operation of KCIRS. As KCIRS is a complementary 
reporting channel, not the sole reporting channel in the railway industry already, KCIRS needs 
to access a wider range of topics that general reporting channels do not address. 
The tentative scope of reporting for KCIRS is as follows: 
• Unsafe work practices; 
• Unsafe conditions; 
• Inadequate safety gear; 
• Inadequate safety facilities; 
• Fatigue; 
• Public safety; 
• Any other risks to safety. 
It is recommended that the practical scope of reporting is specified on a modular basis. 
The scope of reporting should be suitable for the characteristics of the module, which should 
be defined through careful consideration before adoption of the module. 
Designation and management of the scope should be conducted under the supervision of KCO 
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As shown in Figure 30, the operational processes of KCIRS are: 
1) People voluntarily report safety concerns to KCIRS, and KCO verifies whether the 
reported safety concerns are to be handled or not. All cases are accepted, except for 
exclusion targets, e.g., accidents, anonymous reports, personal faults etc.; 
2) KCO’s analysts review the reported safety concerns, and contact the reporters for 
interviews if more detailed information is necessary. The analysis results for the safety 
concerns are stored in a database, and a sanitised report of the safety concern is 
created which has the personal information of the reporter completely excluded; 
3) KCO sends the sanitised report to MSTs. At this point, KCO must determine which MST 
to send the safety concern report to, according to the relationship with the reported 
safety concerns; 
4) MSTs review the reports deployed by KCO and input the information on their database. 
MSTs distribute the reports to relevant CSTs. MSTs must select a number of companies 
to ensure confidentiality, so that no-one can identify the personal information of the 
reporter; 
5) CSTs review the reports and establish corrective actions if necessary, and conduct 
corrective actions after the internal decision process. They report the results to the 
MST and KCO by compiling the results of the reports. 
6) MSTs review the outcome reports from the CST and then record them in the database. 
MSTs analyse the database and share the results with companies within the module; 
7) KCO reviews the outcome report of the CST and then records it in the database. MSTs 
completely remove the personal information associated with the reports from their 
database. Results and analysis of safety concerns must be shared with relative MSTs, 
and each MST shares the information with companies within the module. 
In the operation of KCIRS, KCO and MSTs have important roles. The roles of KCO and MSTs 
must be appropriately distributed so that the roles and responsibilities of the reporting 
process do not focus on a specific organisation. 
If the roles of accepting and managing reports of safety concerns are given to KCO to ensure 
confidentiality, the roles of analysis and distribution of results must be allocated to MSTs to 
prevent the concentration of roles and responsibilities. 
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9.2.5 Securing Confidentiality 
Ensuring confidentiality of reporters is very important in the operation of CIRSs. Even a single 
breach of confidentiality can cause a collapse in confidence of CIRSs (Davies, et al., 2000). 
Barach and Small (2000) demonstrated that the most obvious way to ensure confidentiality 
of reporter and data is providing anonymity, but there are definitive disadvantages of 
anonymity: 
• Analysts cannot contact the reporter when additional information is needed; 
• Anonymous reports are unreliable and not transparent; 
• Ensuring anonymity is often difficult. 
The method of allowing anonymous reporting may be the most fundamental way to ensure 
confidentiality, but for these reasons confidentiality is needed more than anonymity in 
reporting processes (Benn, et al., 2009; Hudson, 2003). Indeed, there have been few instances 
of ensuring anonymity in incident reporting systems introduced (Barach & Small, 2000). 
Allowing anonymous reporting can cause a reduction in the sense of responsibility, which can 
have a serious impact on reliability. Therefore, ensuring confidentiality should be deemed 
more important than guaranteeing anonymity. 
The author used the following principle to ensure confidentiality in KCIRS: 
• Minimise access to personal information; 
• Prevent creation of sensitive personal information in principle; 
• Delete even mandatory personal information after finishing processes; 
• Manage the balanced personal information based on efficiency and confidentiality. 
In this regard, the author presents two approaches to ensure confidentiality for reporters: 
ensuring confidentiality during the reporting process and ensuring confidentiality related to 
data archiving after reporting process. 
Methods for ensuring confidentiality in the reporting process include: 
• Securing confidentiality for reporting methods, e.g., web, mail, etc.; 
• Restrict and minimise handling of reported materials; 
• Pre-verification of confidentiality of the materials before dissemination; 
Methods for ensuring confidentiality related to data archiving after the reporting process 
include: 
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• Disposal of received original data sources after solving the reported safety concerns; 
• Disconnecting the database from the internet; 
• Applying encryption systems to the database; 
• Only storing anonymous data in the permanent database. 
As data management techniques are rapidly developing areas, sufficient review processes are 
required before application of robust security technologies. 
Data management techniques need to be applied to the most powerful security technologies; 
ongoing improvement is necessary during operation periods as well as during initial processes. 
9.2.6 Systematic Evaluation Programme 
The function of evaluation is intended to validate the effectiveness of CIRSs. Once the 
effectiveness of CIRSs is validated, the rationale for expanding their application is easily 
acquired. In addition, there is an advantage that errors can be corrected in the early stage 
through evaluation processes if CIRSs are adopted more widely. 
CIRAS, the UK’s CIRS in the railway industry, was simultaneously applied in Britain in 2000 and 
does not have a specific evaluation function (Langer, 2014). It is obvious that CIRAS has 
contributed greatly to improve railway safety in Britain, but it is regrettable that the 
contribution cannot be objectively measured. 
On the other hand, C3RS, the US’s CIRS for the railway industry, has been applied gradually, 
and a systematic evaluation programme has been implemented at the same time by an 
independent external agency (Volpe National Transportation Systems Center) (Ranney, et al., 
2015). This is a good example of a process of ensuring the validity of a CIRS before extending 
application. Identifying the current situation exactly is important in setting proper goals. Thus, 
an evaluation process is necessary for the efficient adoption of CIRSs. 
Evaluation can be divided into two types: self-evaluation and external evaluation. External 
evaluation is desirable for fairness, while self-evaluation is desirable to maximise the 
effectiveness of learning through continuous self-evaluation. 
In accordance with the objectives of education, i.e., continuous improvement, the author 
selected an internal evaluation system to maximise a continuous learning culture, and 
granted the role to KCO. 
However, it is also a good approach for KCO to conduct an evaluation together with an 
independent research institution. This can complement objectivity and expertise, which is the 
drawback of internal self-evaluations. In order to conduct objective and effective evaluation, 
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establishing an evaluation plan is important. Through evaluation planning, the evaluation 
structure of CIRS should be constructed as follows: 
• Evaluation purpose; 
• Evaluation scope; 
• Evaluation stakeholders; 
• Evaluation methodology, e.g., interview, questionnaire survey, data analysis, etc.; 
• Evaluation cycles, e.g., adoption phase (baseline, intermediate and final evaluation) and 
operation phase (annual evaluation). 
The use of reliable data improves the quality of evaluation. Selection of the data types to use 
is important. Therefore, the effectiveness of data should be thoroughly evaluated at the stage 
of evaluation planning. Thus, it is possible to conduct comprehensive evaluation on CIRSs 
through adoption of safety data as follows: 
• Safety culture; 
• Accidents and incidents; 
• Fatalities; 
• Corrective actions; 
• Derailments and damage to facilities; 
• Other safety indicators. 
9.2.7 Education and Improvement Activities 
The function of education is related to sustainability of CIRSs. Ongoing education of staff is 
essential for the continuous operation of CIRSs, because many safety concerns cannot be 
reported if the concept and processes of CIRSs are not properly explained to staff in advance. 
In that case, many frontline staff are often not convinced of the confidentiality of systems. 
The importance of the function of education increases particularly in areas where personnel 
are frequently replaced. Therefore, it is appropriate to perpetuate the function of education. 
To achieve this, it is more efficient to unify the roles of education because it is necessary to 
secure more than a certain scale of organisation. 
Therefore, the author also gave the role of education to KCO. 
However, often KCO may not be able to afford to educate the whole railway industry because 
operational units are usually very small. Compared to the scale of operational units, there 
may be many organisations. In order to overcome that, the role of education may be shared 
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 
Korea's Railway Safety Culture 
Beomjoon Park 





with other operational units, e.g., important education can be implemented by KCO, and 
ongoing education can be considered as a role shared with MSTs. 
9.2.8 Adoption Methods of KCIRS 
CIRSs are clearly beneficial to improve safety and safety culture. There are two ways of 
adopting the scheme: 
• Instant adoption by the whole railway industry; 
• Incremental adoption by several railways. 
In the UK, CIRAS (the UK’s CIRS in railways) began in 1996, and was extended to include all 
mainline railways in Britain by the influence of the Ladbroke Grove collision (1999). In the US, 
C3RS (the US’s CIRS in railways) began in 2007 and it is being operated in eight railway 
companies at the moment. C3RS is gradually expanding its scope of application. 
Instant adoption by the whole railway industry is ideal, but CIRSs are based on the idea of 
voluntary involvement. It may need much more time for negotiations among all railway 
companies if there are no fatal tuning points, such as the Ladbroke Grove disaster. 
Thus, it is obvious to choose the second option. To introduce a CIRS on Korea’s railway 
industry, the author intends to present the following method: 
• Select a module to adopt a CIRS in Korea’s railway industry as a pilot project; 
• Establish an evaluation plan and criteria for the module; 
• Adopt a CIRS in a module; 
• Evaluate the results of the module for adoption of the CIRS; 
• Complement the errors and faults that are found through an evaluation period; 
• Extend the scope of CIRSs to the whole railway industry. 
This adoption process of CIRSs is very similar to the process in the US. 
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9.3 Future Work 
This research was intended to improve safety culture through changes in the reporting culture 
of Korea’s railway industry. The author identified that Korea’s railways have a relatively 
positive safety culture but a lack perception of the concept of safety culture. However, at the 
same time, there were also things to improve. 
In particular, the author identified that a new reporting channel is necessary to complement 
the existing reporting channels because of concerns about under-reporting, and 
dissatisfaction with existing reporting channels. Based on these findings, the author 
developed a CIRS model suitable for Korea’s railway industry. 
However, more specific implementation measures are necessary to adopt the KCIRS model. 
In particular, further research on the next three items will enhance the effectiveness of KCIRS. 
9.3.1 Developing a Detailed Evaluation Programme 
The author regards an evaluation programme as the most important part of the KCIRS model. 
The author has mentioned in chapter 9.2 the evaluation system of KCIRS. However, chapter 
9.2 presented only a framework for evaluation of KCIRS. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct 
further research on a more practical methodology for the evaluation process. 
In particular, it is necessary to conduct research on data types, indicators and criteria for 
evaluation. Measurement tools have been developed extensively, but have not been 
specialised for CIRSs. 
If further specific methodology is developed through further research, it will be more 
beneficial for improving safety culture by adoption of CIRSs. 
9.3.2 Specialisations for Other Modules 
The KCIRS model is constructed on a modular basis, depending on the situations and 
conditions in Korea’s railway industry. 
Accordingly, the KCIRS model presented in chapter 9.2, is based on the module of railway 
construction and maintenance. The construction and maintenance sector is important in the 
railway industry, but other modules, e.g., operations, metro, etc., also occupy important 
territory in the railways. Therefore, in addition to the construction and maintenance module 
presented in this research, further research is needed for each module. 
Further clarification of the KCIRS model, through additional research into consideration of the 
characteristics of each module, should be conducted before the adoption of the KCIRS model. 
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In particular, metros which are operated by local governments, or private railways, have 
different characteristics to mainline railways, and therefore should be researched accordingly. 
9.3.3 Standardisation for Increasing Applicability 
The KCIRS model has been designed to apply to Korea’s railway industry which has not yet 
adopted a CIRS. Besides Korea, many countries around the world have not introduced CIRSs 
in their railway industry. Improvement of reporting culture through CIRSs is a rational means 
of creating a positive safety culture and thus requires efforts to propagate it. 
This requires research into standardisation of the KCIRS model. 
Although this involved research into existing reporting channels, the KCIRS model was 
compiled based on Korea’s railway industry. 
Since the purpose and operation method of reporting channels is different depending on the 
situations and conditions of each country, consideration of these is required. 
Standardisation of CIRS models is necessary to facilitate improvement in safety culture 
through CIRS adoption in countries where one has not yet been applied. 
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This research was conducted to improve the safety culture in Korea’s railway industry. For 
this purpose, the author selected employees of railway construction sites adjacent to railway 
operations in Korea, and conducted case studies, questionnaire surveys and interviews. 
Through this research, the author identified their positive safety culture, but at the same time 
found some areas of safety to improve. In particular, the author identified the necessity for a 
new reporting channel because many people were worried about under-reporting and felt 
uncomfortable with existing reporting channels. 
Based on these findings, the author developed a new CIRS model, called the KCIRS model, 
that complies with Korea’s railway conditions. 
To this end, operational methods were researched, i.e., the structure of the model, reporting 
process and scope, roles and responsibilities, measures for securing confidentiality, strategies 




• Korea’s railway safety performance has steadily improved to date but safety culture 
should be improved more; 
• Application of CIRSs is beneficial for improving safety culture; 
• Confidentiality is the most important value of CIRSs; 
• Evaluation systems of CIRSs have various advantages. 
 
Questionnaire Surveys 
• Korea’s railway safety culture requires improvements in some areas; 
• Under-reporting of safety concerns was inferred; 




• Korea’s railway industry has a systematic SMS; 
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10.3 Future Work 
Through this research, the author identified that a new reporting channel is necessary to 
complement existing reporting channels. Based on these findings, the KCIRS model was 
developed for Korea’s railway industry. 
However, more specific implementation measures are necessary to enhance the 
effectiveness of the KCIRS model: 
• Developing a detailed evaluation programme 
More practical methodologies for the evaluation process, which will be beneficial to 
improve safety culture by adoption of CIRSs, are necessary; 
• Specialisations for modules 
KCIRS is a modular model and is based on the module of construction and maintenance, 
thus further clarification for other modules is necessary before actual adoption of KCIRS; 
• Standardisation to increase applicability 
The KCIRS model has been designed to apply to Korea, but many other countries around 
the world have not yet introduced CIRSs. Therefore, the standardisation of CIRSs is 
necessary to facilitate their adoption. 
This further research will be beneficial to improve safety culture by adoption of CIRSs. 
  
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 
Korea's Railway Safety Culture 
Beomjoon Park 





11 List of References 
Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission, 2007. Railway accident 
investigation report (excerpt), Tokyo: ARAIC. 
Barach, P. & Small, S. D., 2000. Reporting and preventing medical mishaps: lessons from non-
medical near miss reporting. British Medical Journal, 320(7237), pp. 759-763. 
Benn, J. et al., 2009. Feedback from incident reporting information and action to improve 
patient safety. Quality & Safety in Health Care, Volume 18, pp. 11-21. 
Choudhry, R. M., Fang, D. & Mohamed, S., 2007. The nature of safety culture: a survey of the 
state-of-the-art. Safety Science, 45(10), pp. 993-1012. 
CIRAS, 2017. CIRAS brochure. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ciras.org.uk 
CIRAS, 2017. Membership representatives' handbook. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.ciras.org.uk 
CIRAS, 2017. Report a concern. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ciras.org.uk/report-a-concern/ 
Clarke, S., 1998. Organizational factors affecting the incident reporting of train drivers. Work 
& Stress, 12(1), pp. 6-16. 
Clarke, S., 1998. Safety culture on the UK railway network. Work & Stress, 50(3), pp. 285-292. 
Clarke, S., 1999. Perceptions of organizational safety: implications for the development of 
safety culture. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20(2), pp. 185-198. 
Cooper, M. D., 2000. Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Science, Volume 36, pp. 111-
136. 
Cullen, T. R. H. L., 2001. The Ladbroke Grove rail inquiry part 1 report. s.l.:HSC. 
Cullen, T. R. H. L., 2001. The Ladbroke Grove rail inquiry part 2 report. s.l.:HSC. 
Davies, J. B., Wright, L., Courtney, E. & Reid, H., 2000. Confidential incident reporting on the 
UK railways: the 'CIRAS' system. Cognition, Technology & Work, Volume 2, pp. 117-125. 
Diaz, R. I. & Cabrera, D. D., 1997. Safety climate and attitude as evaluation measures of 
organizational safety. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 29(5), pp. 643-650. 
ERA, 2016. Railway safety performance in the European Union 2016, s.l.: ERA. 
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 
Korea's Railway Safety Culture 
Beomjoon Park 





ERA, 2017. Common safety indicators. [Online]  
Available at: https://erail.era.europa.eu/safety-indicators.aspx 
Fang, D. & Wu, H., 2013. Development of a Safety Culture Interaction (SCI) medel for 
construction projects. Safety Science, Volume 57, pp. 138-149. 
Flin, R., 2007. Measuring safety culture in healthcare: a case for accurate diagnosis. Safety 
Science, 45(6), pp. 653-667. 
FRA, 2005. Model memorandum of understanding for participating stakeholders in C3RS 
demonstration project. s.l.:s.n. 
Glendon, A. I. & Stanton, N. A., 2000. Perspectives on safety culture. Safety Science, 1(34), pp. 
193-214. 
Guldenmund, F. W., 2000. The nature of safety culture: a review of theory and research. 
Safety Science, Issue 34, pp. 215-257. 
Hale, A. R., 2000. Culture's confusion. Safety Science, Issue 34, pp. 1-14. 
Halligan, M. & Zecevic, A., 2011. Safety culture in healthcare: a review of concepts, 
dimensions, measures and progress. BMJ Quality & Safety, Issue 20, pp. 338-343. 
Harvey, J. et al., 2002. An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated 
environment. Work & Stress, 16(1), pp. 18-36. 
Heinrich, H. W., 1980. Industrial accident prevention. 5th ed. s.l.:McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Hidden, A. Q., 1989. Investigation into the Clapham Junction railway accident. London: 
Department of Transport. 
Hollnagel, E., 2014. Safety-1 and Safety-2. 1st ed. s.l.:Ashgate. 
Hollnagel, E., 2016. Barriers and accident prevention. s.l.:Routledge. 
Hollnagel, E., 2016. Barriers and accident prevention. 1st ed. s.l.:Routledge. 
Hollnagel, E., Wears, R. L. & Braithwaite, J., 2015. From Safety-1 to Safety-2: a white paper, 
s.l.: Hollnagel, Erik; Wears, Robert L; Braithwaite, Jeffrey. 
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D. & Leveson, N., 2006. Resilience engineering: concepts and 
precepts. 1st ed. Surrey: Ashgate. 
HSC, 1993. ACSNI Study Group on Human Factors. 3rd report: organising for safety. London: 
HMSO. 
HSE, 1999. Reducing error and influencing behaviour. 2nd ed. s.l.:Health and Safety Executive. 
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 
Korea's Railway Safety Culture 
Beomjoon Park 





HSE, 2004. Investigating accidents and incidents. 1st ed. s.l.:HSE. 
HSE, 2005. A review of safety culture and safety climate literature for development of the 
safety culture inspection toolkit, s.l.: HSE. 
HSE, 2005. Development and validation of the HMRI safety culture inspection toolkit. s.l.:HSE. 
Hudson, P., 2003. Applying the lessons of high risk industries to health care. BMJ Quality & 
Safety, Volume 12, pp. 7-12. 
Hudson, P., 2007. Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national. Safety Science, 
Volume 45, pp. 697-722. 
IAEA, 1986. IAEA safety series no.75-INSAG-1 summary report on the post-accident review 
meeting on the Chernobyl accident. Vienna: IAEA. 
IAEA, 1991. Safety series no. 75-INSAG-4 safety culture, Vienna: IAEA. 
Itoh, K., Abe, T. & Andersen, H. B., 2002. A survey of safety culture in hospitals including staff 
attitudes about incident reporting. Glasgow, University of Glasgow, pp. 144-153. 
Johnson, B. R. & Onwuegbuzie, A. J., 2004. Mixed methods research: a research paradigm 
whose time has come. Educational Researcher, 33(7), pp. 14-26. 
Johnson, B. R., Onwuegbuzie, A. J. & Turner, L. A., 2007. Toward a definition of mixed methods 
research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 10(1077), pp. 112-133. 
Korea Rail Network Authority, 2017. High speed railway constuction. [Online]  
Available at: http://english.kr.or.kr [Accessed 25 05 2017]. 
KR, 2017. Conventional intercity & urban rail network building. [Online]  
Available at: http://english.kr.or.kr  [Accessed 25 5 2017]. 
KTSA, 2014. Korean railway safety performance analysis report 2014, s.l.: KTSA. 
KTSA, 2016. Korean railway accident and safety performance analysis report 2016, s.l.: KTSA. 
Langer, C., 2014. Mitigating safety risk through cofidential reporting. WIT Transactions on 
Information and Communication Technologies, Volume 47, p. 519529. 
Lee, J. S., Choi, Y. G., Baek, J. H. & Son, M. S., 2014. Research of the safety culture level in Korea 
railway corporations. s.l., The Korean Society for Railway. 
Lee, J. S., Han, K. Y., Heo, N. G. & Kim, C. S., 2011. A study on the development of the safety 
culture inspection standards and process in Korean railway. Seoul, The Korean Society 
for Railway, pp. 2548-2556. 
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 
Korea's Railway Safety Culture 
Beomjoon Park 





Lee, J. S., Lim, K. K., Baek, J. H. & Yeum, D. J., 2016. Research of the railroad worker's safety 
culture level and trend analysis. s.l., The Korean Society for Railway. 
Lim, K. & Kim, S., 2014. Designing questionnaires for better reliable survey: case study of using 
railway safety culture survey data. Journal of the Korean Society of Civil Engineers, 34(6), 
pp. 1837-1844. 
Lucas, D. A., 1991. Organisational aspects of near miss reporting. In: Near miss reporting as a 
safety tool. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd, pp. 127-147. 
McDonald, N. & Ryan, F., 1992. Constraints on the development of safety culture: a 
preliminary analysis. The Irish Journal of Psychology, 13(2), pp. 273-281. 
MOLIT, 2014. The safety management structure technical standards. Sejong: MOLIT. 
MOLIT, 2016. Technical standards for railway safety management structure, Sejong, Korea: 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation. 
Morell, J. A. et al., 2006. Confidential close call reporting in the railroad industry: a literature 
review to inform evaluation, Ann Arbor: New Vectors. 
Nagata, T., VanRooyen, M. J. & Ukai, T., 2006. Express railway disaster in Amagasaki: a review 
of urban disaster response capacity in Japan. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Volume 
21(50), pp. 345-352. 
NASA, 2017. Program information: program summary. [Online]  
Available at: https://c3rs.arc.nasa.gov/information/summary.html 
Network Rail, 2016. Network Rail Limited's annual report and accounts 2016, London: 
Network Rail. 
Network Rail, 2017. Close calls: measuring the reporting of close calls. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.networkrail.co.uk 
Noor, K. B. M., 2008. Case study: a strategic research methodology. American Journal of 
Applied Sciences, 5(11), pp. 1602-1604. 
Oxford University Press, 2017. Oxforddictionaries.com. [Online]  
Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/culture 
Oxford University Press, 2017. Oxforddictionaries.com. [Online]  
Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
Pidgeon, N., 1998. Safety culture: key theoretical issues. Work & Stress, 3(12), pp. 201-216. 
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 
Korea's Railway Safety Culture 
Beomjoon Park 





Pidgeon, N. & O'Leary, M., 2000. Man-made disasters: why technology and organizations 
(somtimes) fail. Safety Science, 34(1), pp. 15-30. 
Punch, K. F., 2014. Introduction to social research qualitative and quantitative approach. 3rd 
Edition ed. s.l.:SAGE. 
Ranney, J. M., Davey, M., Morell, J. & Raslear, T., 2015. Confidential close call reporting system 
(C3RS) lessons learned team baseline phase report, Cambridge: Volpe National 
Transportation Systmems Center. 
Ranney, J. & Raslear, T., 2012. Derailments decrease at a C3RS site at midterm, Cambridge: 
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center. 
Ranney, J. & Raslear, T., 2013. Another C3RS site improves safety at midterm, Cambridge: 
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center. 
Ranney, J. & Raslear, T. G., 2015. Continued improvements at one C3RS site, Cambridge: Volpe 
National Transportation Systems Center. 
Raslear, T., Ranney, J. & Multer, J., 2008. Confidential close call reporting system: preliminary 
evaluation findings, Washington DC: FRA. 
Reason, J., 1997. Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited. 
Reason, J., 1998. Achieving a safety culture: theory and practice. Work & Stress, 12(3), pp. 
293-306. 
RSSB, 2017. Risk analysis and safety reporting: close call system. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.rssb.co.uk/risk-analysis-and-safety-reporting/reporting-
systems/close-call-system 
Sammer, C. E., Lykens, K., Singh, K. P. & Mains, D. A., 2010. What is patient safety culture? A 
review of the literature. Nursing Scholarship, 2(42), pp. 156-165. 
Schein, E. H., 2004. Organizational culture and leadership. 3rd ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Sexton, J. B., Thomas, E. J. & Helmreich, R. L., 2000. Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine 
and aviation: cross sectional surveys. BMJ, Volume 320, pp. 745-749. 
Silva, S., Lima, M. L. & Baptista, C., 2004. OSCI: an organisational and safety climate inventory. 
Safety Science, Volume 42, pp. 205-220. 
Son, M. S., Lee, H. S. & Choi, Y. G., 2015. Research of the safety culture level in Korea railway 
corporations. Journal of the Korea Safety Management & Science, 17(2), pp. 79-88. 
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 
Korea's Railway Safety Culture 
Beomjoon Park 





Toft, Y., Dell, G., Klockner, K. K. & Hutton, A., 2012. Model of causation: safety. 1st ed. 
Tullamarine(Victoria): Safety Institute of Australia Ltd. 
Vincent, C., Stanhope, N. & Crowley-Murphy, M., 1999. Reasons for not reporting adverse 
incidnets: an emprical study. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 5(1), pp. 13-21. 
Wallace, B., Ross, A. & Davies, J. B., 2003. Applied hermeneutics and qualitative safety data: 
the CIRAS project. Human Relations, 56(5), pp. 587-607. 
Williamson, A. M., Feyer, A.-M., Cairns, D. & Biancotti, D., 1997. The development of a 
measure of safety climate: the role of safety perceptions and attitudes. Safety Science, 
25(1), pp. 15-27. 
Yin, R. K., 2013. Case study research: design and methods. 5th ed. s.l.:Sage Publications. 
Zohar, D., 1980. Safety climate in industrial organizations: theoretical and applied 
implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65(1), pp. 96-102. 
 
  
Creation of a Confidential Incident Reporting System to Enhance 








12.1 Questions of the Preliminary Questionnaire Survey (adapted from HSE(2005)) 
 
Questionnaire 
Thank you for replying to this questionnaire survey. 
This questionnaire will only be used for academic purposes, and your answers will be secured 
confidentially. 
You are working on a construction site that is close to a mainline railway. Your work can 
influence safety on the railway, and your own safety may be affected by the operation of the 
railway. Therefore, eliminating safety concerns in advance is beneficial for safe working 
conditions and railway operation. 
In the questionnaire survey, a safety concern is defined as an event or condition that is 
unlikely to occur at the moment, but which in the near future may develop into an accident. 
Please bear in mind that accidents are not included in the survey. 
Thank you. 
 
1. What is your position? 
   1) Site manager     2) Supervisor     3) Site engineer     4) Manual worker 
 
2. Does your organisation have a system for people to report safety concerns? 
1) Yes     2) No 
If you answered ‘Yes’, go to Question 3-1. If you answered ‘No’, go to Question 3-2. 
 
3-1. If you have a safety concern reporting system, does it secure confidentiality for 
the people reporting safety issues? 
   1) Yes     2) No 
 
3-2. Have you ever made an informal report about a safety concern? 
   1) Yes     2) No 
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Please reply to the following questions assuming that you have used a safety concern 
reporting system or made an informal report about safety concerns. 
 
4. How often do the issues get resolved? 
   1) Always     2) Quite often     3) Occasionally     4) Very occasionally     5) Never 
 
5. Are you satisfied with the effectiveness of management in dealing with safety concerns? 
   1) Fully    2) Mostly    3) Sometimes    4) Not    5) Never 
 
6. Does management accept that it is its responsibility to deal with the safety concern once it 
has been reported? 
   1) Fully    2) Usually    3) Sometimes    4) Not    5) Never 
 
7. Are staff provided with feedback about the outcome or progress of the reported concern? 
   1) Fully    2) Mostly    3) Sometimes    4) Not    5) Never 
 
8. Are the issues tracked from the time that they are raised through to closure? 
   1) Fully    2) Mostly    3) Sometimes    4) Not    5) Never 
 
9. Are you worried about being punished if you were report a safety concern? 
   1) Fully    2) Mostly    3) Sometimes    4) Not    5) Never 
 
10. Are you willing to report a safety concern if confidentiality can be secured? 
   1) Fully    2) Mostly    3) Sometimes    4) Not    5) Never 
 
11. What do you think are the solutions for under-reporting? 
1) Clear and simple reporting procedure 
2) Confidentiality for reporters 
3) Continuous education for reporting systems 
4) Reinforcement for under-reporting 
5) Other___________________ 
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12.2 Questions of the Main Questionnaire Survey (adapted from HSE (2005)) 
 
Questionnaire 
Thank you for replying to this survey. 
This questionnaire survey was developed to research construction sites near mainline 
railways. 
This questionnaire will only be used for academic purposes, and all the information will be 
treated entirely confidentially. 
Thank you very much for your help. 
 
 
1. What is your gender? 
   1) Male     2) Female 
 
2. What is your civil status? 
   1) Married     2) Not married 
 
3. How old are you? 
   1) 20-29   2) 30-39   3) 40-49   4) 50-59   5) Above 60 
 
4. How much experience do you have in construction overall? 
  1) below 1year  2) 1-5 years 3) 6-10 years  4) 11-15 years  5) 16-20 years  6) Above 20 years 
 
5. How much experience do you have in railway construction? 
  1) below 1year  2) 1-5 years 3) 6-10 years  4) 11-15 years  5) 16-20 years  6) Above 20 years 
 
6. What is your education level? 
  1) Middle school    2) High school     3) University  4) Graduate School 
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7. What is your position? 
   1) Site manager  2) Site engineer  3) Subcontract engineer  4) Manual worker  5) Supervisor 
 
8. What is your working discipline? 
   1) Civil   2) Building   3) Track     3) Electricity    4) Signalling     5) Communication 
 
 
For the following questions, please select an answer which reflects the extent to which you 
agree with the statement. 
 
Safety management (7 questions) 
 
9. Formal systems are in place for managing safety in my workplace: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
10. Safety responsibilities are defined for all personnel: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
11. I am aware of my responsibilities for my own safety: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion 4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
12. I am aware of my responsibilities for others’ safety: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion 4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
13. The effectiveness of the safety management systems and policies is monitored: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion 4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
14. Management involves staff at all levels in safety-related decision-making: 
1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion 4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
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15. Management monitors and reviews employees’ thoughts, opinions and feelings 
concerning the effectiveness of safety management within the organisation: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion 4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
Safety concern (8 questions) 
 
16. An effective system is in place for staff to report safety concerns: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion 4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
17. I know the person or body to whom I must report safety concerns: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion 4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
18. Staffs find it easy to approach management about safety concerns: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
19. Management is dealing effectively with safety concerns: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
20. Management accepts that it is its responsibility to deal with safety concerns once they 
have been reported: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
21. All issues from safety concerns are resolved in a timely fashion: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
22. Staff are provided with feedback about the outcome or progress of a reported concern: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
23. Issues are tracked from the time that they are raised through to closure of the case: 
1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
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Change management (5 questions) 
 
24. My company implements technical changes using a structured method: 
1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
25. My company implements organisational changes using a structured method: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
26. My company implements operational changes using a structured method: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
27. As part of the change process, logs are maintained of the key risks, and action plans for 
the management of these risks are recorded: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
28. Staff at all levels are involved in the change management process: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
Transfer of information about safety related information (3 questions) 
 
29. Safety-related information is effectively communicated to staff at the start of a new 
project, shift handover, or where a handover of duties is required: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
30. All risks and mitigation measures are communicated to the staff concerned: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
31. The communication system is reviewed and monitored for its success: 
1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
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Time-critical and degraded situations (4 questions) 
 
32. Safety is effectively managed during a time-critical and degraded situation: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
33. Staff understand their roles and responsibilities in a time-critical and degraded situation: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
34. In some circumstances, a member of staff is placed under pressure to meet performance 
objectives: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
35. Management checks that safety is being prioritized by staff: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
Incident management (14 questions) 
 
36. I know the incident reporting procedures in my company: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
37. Incidents are sometimes not reported in line with the prescribed processes: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
38. All incidents are investigated: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
39. I know who is responsible for investigating an incident: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
40. The causes of incidents are always determined correctly and reasonably: 
1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
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41. Actions are always taken to prevent the incident from occurring again: 
1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
42. Disciplinary measures are an effective method to reduce incidents: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
43. Disciplinary measures must not be applied: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
44. Disciplinary measures must be applied in case of serious incidents: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
45. Recommendations from the investigation are communicated throughout the company: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
46. I have not reported incidents because of fear of being punished or blamed by colleagues: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
47. I will actively report incidents if confidentiality for reporters can be secured: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
 
48. I will actively report incidents if there is no danger of being punished: 
   1) Strongly disagree   2) Partly disagree   3) No opinion   4) Partly agree   5) Strongly agree 
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12.3 Scenarios for the interviews in Korea (adapted from HSE (2005)) 
Indicator Question 
Scenario 1: How managers manage safety 
Leadership Management visibility Is the safety management system established? 
Do the managers have an interest in this?  





Does your company measure safety culture periodically? 
Employee 
Involvement 
Employee involvement in 
safety discussion 
Is there a way for employees to participate in safety 
management? (staff excluding Safety Manager) 
General question What do you think of the safety management system of 
your site? What are its pros and cons? 
Scenario 2: Someone has a safety concern 
Two-way 
Communication 
Internal safety concern 
reporting system 
Is there a framework for reporting safety concerns? 
Does it work well? Any confusion during operation? 
Approachable management Do you have a chance to meet the manager regarding 
safety concern reporting? Do the managers ask the staff 
if there are any safety concerns? 
Attitude 
towards Blame 
Culture of trust Are safety concerns constantly reported and addressed? 
Does the manager handle safety concerns when safety 
concerns are identified? 
Learning 
Culture 
Safety concern investigation 
and mitigation procedure 
Are reported items fully investigated? 
Safety concerns log Is safety concern spread to employees? Is a similar 
concern processed well if similar concerns occur? 
General question Do you think that safety concerns reported and resolved 
well in your site? 
Scenario 3: A site undergo a significant change 
Employee 
Involvement 
Employee participation in 
the change process 
Does your company have procedures for managing 
changes? 
Do you have a system to communicate with others when 
changes occur? 
Employee training about the 
change 
Is your company aware of the need for training when 
changes occur?  
And is your company doing training accordingly? 
Employee motivation Are employees reporting voluntarily in the process of 
change? Are you positive about change? 
Two-way 
Communication 
Active response to feedback Is there a good communication system with regard to 
changes and employees receiving feedback quickly? 
General question Do you think that timely information related to changes 
are available to employees at the appropriate time? 
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Is safety-related information communicated well at the 
start of the shift or whenever there is a handover of 
duties? 
Do you think these processes are effective? 
Attitude 
towards Blame 
Employee awareness of 
accountabilities 
Are all employees aware of safety responsibilities? 
Is this checked periodically? 
Two-way 
Communication 
Comprehension of safety 
information 
Are employees actively accessing or requesting safety 
information? Do employees or employers have all the 
safety information needed to work? 
General question Do you think the safety related information is 
communicated well at the time of shift or handover in 
your site? 
Scenario 5: Time-critical and degraded situation 
Leadership Safety prioritised behaviour Do you think safety is paramount even if you have a 
serious situation such as being behind schedule or poor 
quality? Is it possible for employees to report without 
regard to cost of safety? 
Performance vs. safety 
management priority 
Do managers have clear views that safety is paramount? 
Are there sufficient costs associated with safety? 
Attitude 
towards Blame 
Safety accountability Do managers take charge of safety first and take 
responsibility according to their results? Are all staff and 
manual workers fully aware of their responsibilities and 
obligations in emergency situations? 
General question Do you think that safety system is being constructed and 
implemented in your site so that safety can be 
maintained even in emergency? 
Scenario 6: Events following an incident 
Learning 
Culture 
Incident investigation system Is there a thorough investigation and implementation of 
the measures for root causes of accidents? 
Attitude 
towards Blame 
Fault allocation process Why do you investigate for accidents? To prevent future 
accidents or punishment of those involved? 
Is there any punishment or blame on the person involved 
prior to identifying the root cause? 
Disciplinary process Is the process clearly divided according to the degree of 
error? Does the degree of disposal change every time? 
Two-way 
Communication 
Feedback systems Is there a strategy to share information from accident 
investigations? 
General question Do you think the accident investigation, corrective 
measures, and implementation of measures are properly 
implemented? 
 
